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Abstract
A satisfaction class is a set of nonstandard sentences respecting Tarski’s truth
definition. We are mainly interested in full satisfaction classes, i.e., satisfaction
classes which decides all nonstandard sentences. Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan
proved in 1981 that a countable model of PA admits a satisfaction class if and only
if it is recursively saturated. A proof of this fact is presented in detail in such a
way that it is adaptable to a language with function symbols. The idea that a
satisfaction class can only see finitely deep in a formula is extended to terms. The
definition gives rise to new notions of valuations of nonstandard terms; these are
investigated. The notion of a free satisfaction class is introduced, it is a satisfaction
class free of existential assumptions on nonstandard terms.
It is well known that pathologies arise in some satisfaction classes. Ideas of
how to remove those are presented in the last chapter. This is done mainly by
adding inference rules to M-logic. The consistency of many of these extensions is
left as an open question.
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1Introduction
By the work of Skolem we know there are nonstandard models of Peano Arithmetic
(PA) and we know how to arithmetise logic inside PA due to Go¨del. It is also easy
to see that in any such nonstandard model there are nonstandard elements which
the model thinks are sentences. By Tarski’s truth definition we also know what it
means for a standard sentence to be true. The obvious question is:
When is a nonstandard sentence true?
Given a nonstandard model M of PA a satisfaction class is a (non-definable)
predicate which, in a special sense, is a truth definition for nonstandard sentences,
i.e., it respects Tarski’s truth definition. More formally, a satisfaction class is a
set Σ of standard and nonstandard sentences, extending the elementary diagram
of M, such that
¬ϕ ∈ Σ iff ϕ /∈ Σ,
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ iff ϕ ∈ Σ or ψ ∈ Σ, and
∃vi γ ∈ Σ iff there exists a ∈M such that γ[a/vi] ∈ Σ,
for any nonstandard sentences ϕ, ψ and ∃viγ. It is not obvious that we can con-
struct such a set, in fact we cannot always do this, depending on the saturation of
M.
This chapter is a short introduction to the subject with some motivation of
the study and a historical overview. Next chapter is intended as a review of the
prerequisites for this thesis; the results are given without proofs. In Chapter 3 we
have rewritten the construction of satisfaction classes in a new style, the language
includes functions, as opposed to [KKL81], and the terms are treated as they
should be treated, i.e., satisfaction classes can only “look” finitely deep into them,
as opposed to [Kay91].
In Chapter 4 we study some alternative definitions of satisfaction classes which
all are weaker in the sense that the sentence ∃x(t = x) does not have to be true.
2 Introduction
We call these satisfaction classes ‘free’ since they are free of existential assumptions
on nonstandard terms.
The last chapter is devoted to pathological examples that arise in satisfaction
classes and how to remove them. We introduce satisfaction classes closed under
propositional proofs and even stronger notions.
All structures studied in this thesis are models of PA in the language LA with
symbols { S,+, ·, 0 }.
1.1 Motivation
From the philosophical point of view there is an obvious motivation for the study
of satisfaction classes. We know what truth is for standard formulas by the truth
definition of Tarski and with the arithmetisation of logic we have the notion of
nonstandard formulas. The obvious question is then, what does it mean for a
nonstandard formula to be true? The study of satisfaction classes is an attempt
to answer this question. In fact, satisfaction classes can be seen as nonstandard
models in the same way as complete consistent Henkin theories represent their
Henkin models. There are 2ℵ0 satisfaction classes in a countable recursively satu-
rated model of PA, which implies that the structure of satisfaction classes is rich
in some sense1 and we can see the study of satisfaction classes as a nonstandard
model theory.
In [Smi84], Smith characterises the recursively saturated models of PA in terms
of satisfaction classes, he constructs a Σ11 formula characterising them. He also ∆
1
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characterises resplendent models in terms of satisfaction classes. This gives us some
idea that the satisfaction classes are more important, in a mathematical sense, then
just as truth definitions. For mathematicians there are a lot of questions to be
answered by this study. For example, one of my motivations for this thesis has
been to find characterisations of other interesting model theoretic properties, such
as saturation properties stronger than recursive saturation.
The study could also be seen as an example of how to work with ill founded
objects, there may even be applications to computer science.
The main reason for the existence of this thesis is to show that there are many
unstudied related notions of satisfaction classes. Some of them arise naturally
when we add function symbols in the language and others when we try to remove
certain “pathologies.”
1.2 Historical background
In 1963 Abraham Robinson published a paper, ‘On languages which are based
on nonstandard arithmetic’ [Rob63], where he discusses syntax and semantics for
nonstandard languages. This is, as far as I know, the first time nonstandard
1In fact, the set of satisfaction classes is dense in the Stone space of the nonstandard Linden-
baum algebra, see [Smi84].
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languages are defined and investigated explicitly. He does not use the word sat-
isfaction class, but he gives two different examples of semantics for nonstandard
languages. He calls them the internal and the external truth definitions. The
external one, defined by the help of Skolem operators, is defined only for formu-
las with finite ‘Robinson-rank’ (which is a complexity measure on nonstandard
formulas), therefore it is not a full satisfaction class.
The internal truth definition is defined as Σ if
(N,Σ0) ≺ 〈M,Σ〉 , 2
where N is the standard model of arithmetic and Σ0 is the standard truth defini-
tion, i.e.,
Σ0 = { ϕ ϕ is a standard sentence in LA and N  ϕ } .
He proves that the external and the internal truth definitions do not coincide and
leaves it, more or less, there.
Later Krajewski [Kra76] returns to the question of the semantics of nonstan-
dard languages. He defines satisfaction classes (even though his definition is rather
weak) and investigates some related notions. He also proves that for some mod-
els of cardinality λ there exists 2λ full satisfaction classes. He does not mention
the question of which models admit satisfaction classes, he only proves that some
specific models do.
In [KKL81] and [Lac81] this question is answered. In the first paper it is shown
that if a countable model is recursively saturated then it admits a satisfaction
class. This is done by using a version of ω-logic (the idea is due to Jeff Paris) and
the result is not surprising. What is more surprising is the result in the second
paper by Lachlan in which he shows that if a model (of any cardinality) admits
a satisfaction class then it is recursively saturated. He proves this using a sort of
overspill he gets from the satisfaction class (proving the result with induction in
the language LA ∪ {Σ } is easy).
In [Smi84] Smith strengthens the results in the two papers above. He shows
that any resplendent model has a satisfaction class and is able to find a ∆12 charac-
terisation of resplendency. He also formulates Lachlan’s proof in a syntactical way
which makes it possible to find a Σ11 formula characterising recursive saturation.
Other important contributions to the study of satisfaction classes are [Kot85],
[KR90a] and [KR90b]. These papers discuss the question of when the structure
〈M,Σ〉 satisfies either induction over Σk formulas or full induction. In the first
paper Kotlarski shows that the satisfaction classes satisfying ∆0 induction are
precisely those closed under nonstandard proofs of first-order logic and including
all nonstandard instances of the axiom of induction. It is easy to see that if a
model admits such a satisfaction class then it satisfies the scheme of reflection:
‘PA ⊢ϕ’→ ϕ.
2In fact, Robinson’s notion is a bit different, but for the purpose of this survey we can think
of internal truth defined in this way.
4 Introduction
The definitions of satisfaction classes in the preceding works are all using a
relational language, i.e., the language 0, 1, σ, π where σ and π are ternary relational
symbols, supposed to express addition and multiplication. The theory PA has to
be extended by some axioms expressing that these relational symbols are in fact
functions. In [Kay91] Kaye investigates the case when PA is expressed in the
language with symbols: +, ·, <, 0 and 1, where + and · are binary function
symbols. Throughout this thesis we will be using the language LA which has one
unary function symbol S, two binary function symbols + and ·, and one constant
symbol 0 (and the equality predicate =).
1.3 Theorems, Propositions, Lemmas, Corollaries and Porisms
We will use the term ‘theorem’ sparsely, it is used to put extra emphasise on
an important result. Propositions are the results which have a value on their
own, and lemmas (or lemmata) are results which help us to prove propositions or
theorems. Corollaries are simple consequences of propositions or theorems (and in
some rare occasions of lemmas), but the, somewhat, unusual term porism is used
for simple consequences of a proof of a proposition, theorem or lemma. It could
for example be a simple generalisation of a proposition which you get by some
minor modifications of the presented proof of the proposition. The term was used
by Euclid, but he used it with a somewhat different meaning, which is not entirely
known, see [Twe00] for more information.
2Prerequisites
To be able to read this thesis the reader needs some background knowledge of
first-order logic, [Men97] is more than enough, and also some knowledge of first-
order arithmetic (Peano Arithmetic), especially its model theory. A good general
reference for this is [Kay91]. In this chapter we will review some of the material,
omitting the proofs of the results.
2.1 Peano Arithmetic
Throughout this thesis M will be a structure in the language LA with symbols S,
+, · and 0, where S is a unary function, + and · are binary function symbols and
0 is a constant symbol. We will as usual write terms and equalities in the more
convenient way by using infix notation, e.g., instead of writing +
(
t1, t2
)
we will
write t1 + t2.
We denote interpretations as usually; the interpretation of S in M is denoted
by SM, the interpretation of + is denoted +M, and so on.
We will consider formulas built up from the logical connectives ¬ and ∨ and
the quantifier ∃. The other connectives and quantifiers are considered to be ab-
breviations in the usual way, ϕ∧ψ is defined to be ¬
(
¬ϕ∨¬ψ
)
, ϕ→ ψ is ¬ϕ∨ψ,
ϕ ↔ ψ is
(
ϕ → ψ
)
∧
(
ψ → ϕ
)
and ∀vi ϕ is ¬∃vi ¬ϕ. We also define exclusive or
ϕ ∨˙ ψ as (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). Later it will be important to note that all these
abbreviations are of constant depth, i.e., the depth only increases a constant num-
ber when replacing the definiendum with the definiens. For example, the depth of
¬
(
¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ
)
is always two more than that of ϕ ∧ ψ.
The variables in the language are v0, v1, . . .. Sometimes we will be a bit sloppy
in the notation and use x, y, w, . . . as names for variables. If ϕ is a formula then
ϕ[t1, . . . , tk/vi1 , . . . , vik ]
will denote the formula you get by substituting all free occurrences of vil with
the term tl, we will always assume that vil is free for tl. Sometimes, when it will
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not cause confusion, we will write ϕ(t) to mean the formula obtained from ϕ by
replacing all the occurrences of the free variable under consideration by the term
t, i.e., ϕ[t/vi] where vi is the variable under consideration. In short, we will adopt
all the usual notations and abbreviations used in the literature.
Let LM be the language LA ∪ { ca a ∈M } (0 and c0M will be regarded as
the same symbol; this is to simplify some definitions below) and let ElDiag(M) be
the theory of the structure M in the language LM, i.e., all LM-formulas true in
M
+, where M+ is the expanded model of M which interprets each symbol ca as
a. Mostly we will not distinguish between the two structures M and M+, hoping
this will not cause any confusion for the reader. Sometimes, mostly when dealing
with standard formulas and terms, we will identify the element a ∈ M with the
constant symbol ca.
Diag(M) is the set of all true standard atomic and negated atomic formulas in
the language LM, so Diag(M)  ElDiag(M).
PA− is the theory with the universal closures of
S(x) = S(y)→ x = y,
S(x) 6= 0,
x 6= 0→ ∃y
(
S(y) = x
)
,
x+ 0 = x,
x+ S(y) = S(x+ y),
x · 0 = 0 and
x · S(y) = x · y + x
as axioms. If we add the axiom scheme of induction:
∀x¯
(
ϕ(0, x¯) ∧ ∀y
(
ϕ(y, x¯)→ ϕ(S(y), x¯)
)
→ ∀y ϕ(y, x¯)
)
for all LA-formulas ϕ, we get Peano Arithmetic or PA for short.
The symbol M will always be assumed to be a structure, in a language extend-
ing LA, satisfying PA and not isomorphic to the standard model N of PA, i.e., M
will be assumed to be a nonstandard model of PA.
The predicate x < y is defined as
∃z
(
z 6= 0 ∧ x+ z = y
)
.
Once again, it will be important later that this definition is of constant depth, i.e.,
∃z(z 6= 0 ∧ t+ z = r) is of depth at most four more than the depth of t < r. We
also define the function x− 1 by the following equation
x− 1 =df (µz)
[(
x = 0 ∧ z = 0
)
∨
(
x 6= 0 ∧ S(z) = x
)]
,
where (µx)ϕ(x) means ‘the least x such that ϕ(x).’
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We will also identify the smallest initial segment of M (i.e., the smallest non-
empty subset of M closed under successor and less than) with the standard model
N, i.e., we assume that N ⊆ M. We will reserve the symbol N to denote the
standard model and ω to denote the first infinite ordinal, which is the same as the
domain of N.
If ϕ(x) is a formula with a free variable we will write ϕ(M) for the set of
elements in M satisfying ϕ(x), i.e.,
{ a ∈M M  ϕ(a) } .
Given a ∈M we define I<a to be the initial segment
{ x ∈M x < a } .
2.2 Coding
We will assume a notion of finite sets and a definable predicate x ∈ y (i.e., an
LA-formula with two free variables) such that the universal closures of
x ∈ y → x < y,
∀w
(
w ∈ x↔ w ∈ y
)
→ x = y,
∃z∀y
(
y ∈ z ↔ y = x
)
,
∃z∀w
(
w ∈ z ↔
[
w ∈ x ∨ w ∈ y
])
,
∃z∀w
(
w ∈ z ↔
[
w ∈ x ∧ w ∈ y
])
, and
∃z∀w
(
w ∈ z ↔
[
w ∈ x ∧ w /∈ y
])
,
are all provable in PA. The sets z (which all are unique by the second property) in
the last four formulas will be denoted { x }, x∪y, x∩y and x\y respectively. We will
also write { x, y }, { x, y, z }, . . . for { x }∪{ y }, { x }∪{ y }∪{ z }, . . . respectively.
The membership predicate can be defined by using the exponentiation function,
we will not go into the details of this here; for a good reference see [HP98].
We also assume a notion of finite sequences, either derived from the notion
of finite sets (see [HP98]) or by the Chinese remainder theorem (see [Kay91]).
The predicate (x)y = z is assumed to be such that the universal closures of the
following formulas are provable in PA,
∃!z (x)y = z,
(x)y 6 x,
∃y (y)0 = x, and
∃w
(
∀i<y (x)i = (w)i ∧ (w)y = z
)
.
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We define the following provable recursive functions (and constant)
len(x) =df(x)0,
[x]y =df(µz)
(
y < len(x) ∧ (x)S(y) = z
)
∨
(
y > len(x) ∧ z = 0
)
,
x⌢y =df(µz) len(x) + len(y) = len(z)
∧ ∀i< len(x) [x]i = [z]i ∧ ∀i< len(y) [y]i = [z]len(x)+i,
[] =df(µx) len(x) = 0,
[x] =df(µy) len(y) = 1 ∧ [y]0 = x,
[x0, . . . , xk] =df [x0]⌢ · · ·⌢[xk],
x ↾ y =df(µz) len(z) = y ∧ ∀i<y [z]i = [x]i,
here (µx)ϕ(x) means ‘the least x such that ϕ(x).’
2.3 Nonstandard languages
We need a Go¨del numbering for the formulas and terms in the language LM. We
might define the Go¨del number for a formula ϕ, denoted ϕ , to be (a code for)
the sequence of the Go¨del numbers of the symbols in ϕ, thus
S(0) = v0 =
[
S , ( , 0 , ) , 0 , v0
]
.
The exact definition we use for Go¨del numbering is unimportant. But it will
not, except in some special occasions, be assumed to be defined in this way; any
numbering such that the properties below hold will work.
There are LA-formulas Form(x), Sent(x), Term(x) and ClTerm(x) coding, in
PA, the formulas, sentences, terms and closed terms of LM respectively. Let FV
be the function (defined in PA) such that FV(ϕ) is (an element coding) the set of
Go¨del numbers of the free variables of ϕ. The precise construction of the formulas
are not important, but some of the properties of them are. Those are listed below.
The notation S(x) will be taken, when appropriate, to mean the function
which takes a Go¨del number of a term t and returns the Go¨del number of the term
S(t). By ‘when appropriate’ we mean that in some cases S(x) means the Go¨del
number of the term S(x), but we will try to write S(vi) in that case. Of course
this also applies to for example ∃vi x which is a function taking a Go¨del number
of a formula ϕ and an i and returning the Go¨del number of the formula ∃vi ϕ.
With the assumption that a Go¨del number is a sequence of (Go¨del numbers of)
symbols we get that
PA ⊢ ∀x S(x) =
[
S , (
]⌢x⌢[ ) ].
If x is not a Go¨del number, or a Go¨del number of “wrong type,” then the
functions can be defined to take the value 0.
In PA we can define the substitution function that takes the Go¨del number
of a formula/term, a term and a variable and returns the Go¨del number of the
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formula/term we get by substituting all occurrences of the given variable with the
given term. We denote this function x[y/z].
That the universal closures of the following formulas are provable in PA tells
us that all elements that should satisfy Term(x) does so.
Term( 0 ) ∧ Term( cx ) ∧ Term( vi ),
Term(x)→ Term( S(x) ),
Term(x) ∧ Term(y)→ Term( x+ y ), and
Term(x) ∧ Term(y)→ Term( x · y ).
The analogous formulas for Form(x) are:
Term(x) ∧ Term(y)→ Form( x = y ),
Form(x)→ Form( ¬x ),
Form(x) ∧ Form(y)→ Form( x ∨ y ) and
Form(x)→ Form( ∃vi x ).
The next properties tell us that nothing other than what is supposed to satisfies
Term(x). This is the inductive property of terms:
ϕ( 0 ) ∧ ∀i ϕ( vi ) ∧ ∀xϕ( cx ) ∧ ∀x, y
[
Term(x) ∧ Term(y) ∧ ϕ(x)
∧ ϕ(y)→ ϕ( S(x) ) ∧ ϕ( x+ y ) ∧ ϕ( x · y )
]
→ ∀x
(
Term(x)→ ϕ(x)
)
for all LM-formulas ϕ(x). The analogous property for Form(x):
∀x, y
(
Term(x) ∧ Term(y)→ ϕ( x = y )
)
∧ ∀x, y, i
[
Form(x) ∧ Form(y)
∧ ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y)→ ϕ( ¬x ) ∧ ϕ( x ∨ y ) ∧ ϕ( ∃vix )
]
→ ∀x
(
Form(x)→ ϕ(x)
)
for all LM-formulas ϕ(x).
There are also some similar properties for FV(x).
FV( 0 ) = 0 ∧ ∀x FV( cx ) = 0,
∀i FV( vi ) = { vi } ,
∀x, y
[
Term(x) ∧ Term(y)→ FV( S(x) ) = FV(x) ∧ FV( x+ y ) = FV( x · y )
= FV( x = y ) = FV(x) ∪ FV(y)
]
, and
∀x, y, i
[
Form(x) ∧ Form(y)→ FV( ¬x ) = FV(x) ∧ FV( x ∨ y ) = FV(x) ∪ FV(y)
∧ FV( ∃vix ) = FV(x) \ { vi }
]
.
Last we have the defining properties of ClTerm(x) and Sent(x):
ClTerm(x)↔ Term(x) ∧ FV(x) = 0 and
Sent(x)↔ Form(x) ∧ FV(x) = 0.
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Observe that these properties define the formulas Term(x), Form(x), ClTerm(x)
and Sent(x) and the function FV(x) up to provable equivalence in PA.
Two very important properties, which follows from the properties above, of PA
is the following, usually called the ‘unique readability property.’ PA proves the
following two sentences:
∀x
(
Term(x)→
[
∃!i x = vi ∨˙ ∃!y x = cy ∨˙ ∃!y
(
Term(y) ∧ x = S(y)
)
∨˙ ∃!y, z
(
Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ x = y + z
)
∨˙ ∃!y, z
(
Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ x = y · z
)])
and
∀x
(
Form(x)→
[
∃!y, z
(
Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ x = z = y
)
∨˙ ∃!y
(
Form(y) ∧ x = ¬y
)
∨˙ ∃!y, z
(
Form(y) ∧ Form(z) ∧ x = y ∨ z
)
∨˙ ∃!y, i
(
Form(y) ∧ x = ∃vi y
)])
.
These properties make it possible to handle nonstandard languages. Let ∗LM be
the nonstandard language which corresponds to LM, i.e., the “terms” of
∗LM are
all a ∈M such that M  Term(a) and the “formulas” are all a ∈M  Form(a), etc.
The unique readability properties give us the possibility to handle these “terms”
and “formulas” in much the same way as the standard ones, with the important
exception that they need not be well-founded, e.g., ¬¬ . . .¬0 = 1, where the dots
represent a nonstandard number of negation signs, is a ∗LM-formula. Therefore,
and this is very important, we do not have “external” induction on ∗LM-terms and
∗LM-formulas.
1
2.4 Partial truth definitions
Due to Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth we cannot find an LM-
formula ϕ such that
PA ⊢ϕ( ψ )↔ ψ
for all LM-sentences ψ. What we can do is the following.
Theorem 2.1. There is an LA-definable function val such that PA proves
val( t ) = t
for all closed LM-terms t, and
∀x
(
ClTerm(x)→ val( S(x) ) = S(val(x))
)
∧ ∀x, y
(
ClTerm(x) ∧ ClTerm(y)→ val( x+ y ) = val(x) + val(y)
)
∧ ∀x, y
(
ClTerm(x) ∧ ClTerm(y)→ val( x · y ) = val(x) · val(y)
)
.
1We have induction inside the model, that is what the inductive property of Form(x) and
Term(x) tells us.
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Let ∆k, Σk and Πk be defined as usual, e.g., Σ1 is the set of all formulas of the
form ∃x¯ ϕ(x¯) where ϕ(x¯) is in ∆0. There are LA-formulas coding these sets in PA
in the usual sense. Let us write, for example, x ∈ ∆0 for the formula coding ∆0
applied to the variable x.
Theorem 2.2. There are LA-formulas TrΓ(x), where Γ is ∆k,Σk or Πk, such
that PA proves
TrΓ( ψ )↔ ψ
for all sentences ψ ∈ Γ,
∀x, y
[
ClTerm(x) ∧ ClTerm(y)→
(
Tr∆0( x = y )↔ val(x) = val(y)
)]
,
∀x
[
x ∈ ∆0 ∧ Sent(x)→
(
Tr∆0( ¬x )↔ ¬ Tr∆0(x)
)]
,
∀x, y
[
x, y ∈ ∆0 ∧ Sent(x) ∧ Sent(y)→
(
Tr∆0( x ∨ y )↔ Tr∆0(x) ∨ Tr∆0(y)
)]
,
∀x, i, y
[
x ∈ ∆0 ∧ Sent( ∃vi x )→
(
Tr∆0( ∃vi<cy x )↔ ∃z<y Tr∆0( x[cz/vi] )
)]
,
and also
∀x, i
[
∃vi x ∈ Γ ∧ Sent( ∃vi x )→
(
TrΓ( ∃vi x )↔ ∃y TrΓ( x[cy/vi] )
)]
, and
∀x, i
[
∀vi x ∈ Γ ∧ Sent( ∀vi x )→
(
TrΓ( ∀vi x )↔ ∀y TrΓ( x[cy/vi] )
)]
.
For explicit constructions see [Kay91].
2.5 Recursive saturation and resplendency
In this section M can be any structure in any recursive language L . Let LM be
the language which extends L with constant symbols naming all elements in M.
Given a theory T , a type in T is a countable set of formulas
t(x¯) = { ϕi(x¯, a¯) i ∈ ω }
such that ϕi(x¯, y¯) are L -formulas with finitely many free variables x¯ and y¯; a¯ are
parameters from M; and T + t(c¯), where c¯ are new constant symbols, is consistent.
A type over a model M is a type in the elementary diagram of the model, i.e., in
ElDiag(M). A type t(x¯) is recursive if the set{
ϕ(x¯, y¯) there exists a¯ ∈M such that ϕ(x¯, a¯) ∈ t(x¯)
}
⊆ ω
is recursive. If t(x¯) is a type then it is realized in M if there are elements m¯ ∈M
such that M  ϕ(m¯) for all ϕ(x¯) ∈ t(x¯).
Definition 2.3. M is recursively saturated if all recursive types in M are realized.
The following proposition says that all consistent theories have recursively sat-
urated models of any cardinality.
Proposition 2.4. For every M there is an elementary extension N ≻ M that is
recursively saturated and such that |N| = |M|.
12 Prerequisites
Now to a slightly different notion, that of resplendency. A Σ11 formula is a
second-order formula of the form ∃X ϕ(X) where X is a set variable and ϕ(X) is
a first-order formula in the language extended with the set variable X .
Definition 2.5. M is resplendent if for all Σ11 LM-sentences Φ, such that
ElDiag(M) ∪ { Φ }
is consistent, we have M  Φ.
In other words M is resplendent if as many as possible Σ11 sentences are true
and it is recursively saturated if all recursive types are realized. Observe that both
these notions apply to all structures, not only models of PA. The next theorem
follows from work by Kleene [Kle52].
Theorem 2.6. If M is resplendent then it is recursively saturated.
There is a converse if the model is countable, this result is due to Barwise and
Schlipf and independently Ressayre.
Theorem 2.7 ([BS76]). If M is countable and recursively saturated then it is
resplendent.
There are several model theoretic properties which are Σ11, making resplendent
models easy to work with. In this thesis we will express the consistency of logics,
which are definable in some model, by an Σ11 formula:
∃X
(
all axioms are in X ∧X is closed under the inference rules
∧ ∃x
(
x is a formula ∧ x /∈ X
))
.
Hopefully, the reader is now ready to face satisfaction classes.
3Satisfaction classes
When defining satisfaction classes we have two different approaches to choose
from. The historical way (used in [Kra76]) is to look at nonstandard formulas of
LA and define a satisfaction class to be a set of pairs; the first component being a
nonstandard formula of LA and the second being a code for a sequence of elements
in M. The intention is that the sequence satisfies the formula, i.e., if we substitute
the free variable vi with the ith element of the sequence then the result is “true” in
M. The disadvantage of this approach is that we need some machinery to handle
different ways of getting the “same” formula. We will give an example; let ǫ0 be
v0 6= v0 and ǫi+1 be ǫi∨ ǫi, also let ǫ′0 be v0 6= 0 and ǫ
′
i+1 be ǫ
′
i∨ ǫ
′
i, then we clearly
want 〈ǫi, [0]〉 ∈ Σ iff 〈ǫ′i, [0]〉 ∈ Σ.
Conjecture 3.1. There is a satisfaction class Σ, in the sense of [Kra76] and
[KKL81], such that 〈ǫa, [0]〉 ∈ Σ and 〈ǫ′a, [0]〉 /∈ Σ for some a ∈M.
We think that by redefining M-logic to work with pairs of LA-formulas and
elements ofM it should be possible to prove the conjecture by reproving the results
in this chapter.
We are going to define a satisfaction class to be a set of ∗LM-sentences; the
intention is that the sentences are those which are “true” in M. The disadvantage
of this approach is that the name ‘satisfaction class’ seems a bit awkward, a better
name would probably be ‘truth class’, but for historical reasons we will stick with
it.
We will use the two notations x ∈ Σ and Σ(x) to mean the same thing, i.e., in
this case the symbol ∈ has nothing to do with the coding of finite sets. We hope
this will not confuse the reader, but instead make the formulas easier to read.
A comment on the word class should be made here. A class in the model
theory of arithmetic is a subset C of the domain of the model such that for all a,
C ∩ I<a is definable (remember that I<a = { x ∈M x < a }). It is just a mere
and unfortunate coincidence that the word is used in the term ‘satisfaction class.’
Definition 3.2. A satisfaction class Σ is an external subset of M satisfying the
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following conditions in M:
x ∈ Σ→ Sent(x), (3.1)
ca = cb ∈ Σ↔ a = b, (3.2)
t = t ∈ Σ, (3.3)
t = r ∈ Σ→ r = t ∈ Σ, (3.4)
t = r ∈ Σ ∧ r = s ∈ Σ→ t = s ∈ Σ, (3.5)
S(t) = ca ∈ Σ↔ ∃x
(
t = cx ∈ Σ ∧ S(x) = a
)
, (3.6)
t+ r = ca ∈ Σ↔ ∃x, y
(
t = cx ∈ Σ ∧ r = cy ∈ Σ ∧ x+ y = a
)
, (3.7)
t · r = ca ∈ Σ↔ ∃x, y
(
t = cx ∈ Σ ∧ r = cy ∈ Σ ∧ x · y = a
)
, (3.8)
t = r ∈ Σ↔ ∃x
(
t = cx ∈ Σ ∧ r = cx ∈ Σ
)
, (3.9)
¬ϕ ∈ Σ↔ ϕ /∈ Σ, (3.10)
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ↔
(
ϕ ∈ Σ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ
)
and (3.11)
∃vi γ ∈ Σ↔ ∃x
(
γ[cx/vi] ∈ Σ
)
, (3.12)
for all closed ∗LM-terms t, r and s and all
∗LM-sentences ϕ, ψ and ∃viγ.
The clauses (3.2)-(3.9) take care of the atomic formulas and we could replace
them with the single clause
t = r ∈ Σ↔ M  val(t) = val(r),
but that would yield a stronger notion. We will look more closely at this later in
Chapter 5.
Observe that there is a first-order formula SatCl(X) in the languageLA∪{X }
such that for any subset A of M A is a satisfaction class iff M  SatCl(A). The
formula SatCl(X) is the conjunction of the universal closures (with the universal
quantifiers restricted to closed terms and sentences) of (3.1)-(3.12), which all are
first-order properties.
Proposition 3.3. Let Σ be a satisfaction class, then the following is true in the
structure 〈M,Σ〉:
ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ↔ ϕ ∈ Σ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ,
ϕ→ ψ ∈ Σ↔
(
ϕ ∈ Σ→ ψ ∈ Σ
)
,
ϕ↔ ψ ∈ Σ↔
(
ϕ ∈ Σ↔ ψ ∈ Σ
)
, and
∀vi γ ∈ Σ↔ ∀x
(
γ[cx/vi] ∈ Σ
)
,
for all ∗LM-sentences ϕ, ψ and ∀vi γ.
Proposition 3.4. If Σ is a satisfaction class, ϕ an LM-sentence and M  ϕ then
ϕ ∈ Σ, i.e., ElDiag(M) ⊆ Σ.
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Proof. We first prove the statement for sentences ϕ of the form t = ca for some
closed term t and some a ∈M, by induction on the construction of t.
If t is cb then M  cb = ca so cb = ca ∈ Σ by (3.2).
Suppose t is S(t′) for some closed term t′; then M  t′ = cb for some b ∈M and
by the induction hypothesis we have t′ = cb ∈ Σ. Also S
M(b) = a so S(t′) = ca ∈ Σ
by (3.6).
Suppose t is t1 + t2, then there are b, b
′ ∈ M such that M  t1 = cb and
M  t2 = cb′ . By the induction hypothesis we have t1 = cb ∈ Σ and t2 = cb′ ∈ Σ.
We know that b+M b′ = a, so t1 + t2 = ca ∈ Σ by (3.7). The case when t is t1 · t2
is treated in a similar way.
Suppose now M  t1 = t2 then there is a b ∈ M such that M  t1 = b and
M  t2 = b, so t1 = cb ∈ Σ and t2 = cb ∈ Σ which by (3.4) and (3.5) implies
t1 = t2 ∈ Σ.
If M  t1 6= t2 then there are b1, b2 ∈M such that
M  t1 = b1 ∧ t2 = b2 ∧ b1 6= b2,
so t1 = cb1 ∈ Σ and t2 = cb2 ∈ Σ. By (3.2) we also have cb1 6= cb2 ∈ Σ and by
(3.4) and (3.5) we have t1 6= t2 ∈ Σ.
We have proved that Diag(M) ⊆ Σ. We should prove that if ϕ is an LM-
sentence then
M  ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ Σ
by induction on ϕ. The case when ϕ is atomic is proven. The induction step is
easy and left to the reader.
Remark 3.5. By Tarski’s theorem of the undefinability of truth a satisfaction class
Σ is not definable. Moreover Σ ∩ I<a for a > ω is not definable, since this would
also yield a truth definition, therefore Σ is not a class.
Given a set of ∗LM-sentences X , define the binary relation ∼X (or just ∼ if X
is understood from the context) on the set of closed ∗LM-terms, ClTerm(M), as
follows
t1 ∼X t2 iff t1 = t2 ∈ X.
If ∼X is an equivalence relation let ClTerm(M)/∼X be the set of equivalence
classes t of ClTerm(M) and define the functions SMX , +MX and ·MX by
S
MX ( t ) =df S(t),
t+MX r =df t+ r and
t ·MX r =df t · r
if they all are well-defined. This defines an LA-structure
(ClTerm(M)/∼X , S
MX ,+MX , ·MX , 0).
Let MX denote this structure, when it is well-defined.
The following equivalent definition of a satisfaction class may be well worth
notice; it will play the main role of Chapter 4.
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Proposition 3.6. Σ is a satisfaction class iff it is a unary predicate on M such
that ∼Σ is an equivalence relation, MΣ is well-defined, the canonical map
f : M→MΣ, a 7→ ca
is an isomorphism and
x ∈ Σ→ Sent(x), (3.1)
¬ϕ ∈ Σ↔ ϕ /∈ Σ, (3.10)
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ↔
(
ϕ ∈ Σ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ
)
, and (3.11)
∃vi γ ∈ Σ↔ ∃x
(
γ[cx/vi] ∈ Σ
)
(3.12)
holds for all ∗LM-sentences ϕ, ψ and ∃vi γ.
Proof. Assume Σ is a satisfaction class. By (3.3)-(3.5) it is clear that ∼Σ is an
equivalence relation and by (3.6)-(3.8) MΣ is well-defined. It is also clear that
the mapping f is a bijection since if a 6= b then ca = cb /∈ Σ so f(a) 6= f(b)
and if t ∈ ClTerm(M) then t = t ∈ Σ, so by (3.9) there exists m ∈ M such that
t = cm ∈ Σ, i.e., f(m) = t. We also have
f(SM(a)) = cSM(a) = S(ca) = S
MX (ca) = S
MX (f(a)),
f(a+M b) = ca+Mb = ca + cb = ca +
MX cb = f(a) +
MX f(b) and
f(a ·M b) = ca·Mb = ca · cb = ca ·
MX cb = f(a) ·
MX f(b),
so f is really an isomorphism.
Assume now that Σ satisfies the conditions above.
We have to prove conditions (3.2) and (3.6)-(3.9) in the definition of satisfaction
classes. The other follows immediately.
(3.2) It follows from the injectivity of f , since if a 6= b ∈ M then f(a) 6= f(b)
so ca 6= cb, i.e., ca 6= cb ∈ Σ.
(3.6) Assume S(t) = ca ∈ Σ, we have to find m such that t = cm ∈ Σ and
S
M(m) = a. We have
a = f−1(ca) = f
−1(S(t)) = f−1(SMX ( t )) = SM(f−1( t )),
so m = f−1( t ) works since t = f(m) implies t = cm ∈ Σ. On the other hand
assume that there exists m such that t = cm ∈ Σ and S
M(m) = a then
S(t) = SMX ( t ) = SMX (cm) = S
MX (f(m)) = f(SM(m)) = ca.
(3.7) Assume t + r = ca ∈ Σ and let m = f−1( t ) and m′ = f−1(r) then
a = m+M m′ and t = cm ∈ Σ and r = cm′ ∈ Σ. If m+M m′ = a, t = cm ∈ Σ and
r = cm′ ∈ Σ then f−1( t ) = m and f−1(r) = m′ so
a = f−1(t+MX r) = f−1(t+ r).
In other words f(a) = t+ r, i.e., t+ r = ca ∈ Σ. (3.8) Similar as above.
(3.9) Assume t = r ∈ Σ then f−1( t ) = f−1(r) = m so t = cm, r = cm ∈ Σ
and if t = cm, r = cm ∈ Σ then t = cm = r, so t = r ∈ Σ.
3.1 Inductive partial satisfaction classes 17
Question 3.7. Are satisfaction classes built up by two “parts;” one with closed
terms and equality and one with “the rest,” in the following sense: Given a relation
∼ satisfying the conditions in Proposition 3.6 is there a satisfaction class Σ such
that the relation ∼Σ coincides with ∼?
A partial answer to this question is given in Proposition 3.58.
3.1 Inductive partial satisfaction classes
This section is included as an introduction to satisfaction classes; the results will
not be used later and may therefore be skipped. For simplicity the satisfaction
classes in this section will all include the set
{ t = r M  val(t) = val(r) } .
Therefore, in this section, Σ ⊆M is a satisfaction class iff
〈M,Σ〉  ∀x
(
x ∈ Σ→ Sent(x)
)
∧ ∀xΨ(Σ, x),
where Ψ(Σ, x) is the formula
∀y, z
[
ClTerm(y) ∧ ClTerm(z) ∧ x = y = z →
(
x ∈ Σ↔ val(y) = val(z)
)]
∧ ∀y
[
Sent(y) ∧ x = ¬y →
(
x ∈ Σ↔ y /∈ Σ
)]
∧ ∀y, z
[
Sent(y) ∧ Sent(z) ∧ x = y ∨ z →
(
x ∈ Σ↔ y ∈ Σ ∨ z ∈ Σ
)]
∧ ∀y, i
[
Sent(∃vi y) ∧ x = ∃vi y →
(
x ∈ Σ↔ ∃z y[cz/vi] ∈ Σ
)]
.
We will assume that if ψ is a subformula or subterm of ϕ then ψ 6 ϕ ; under
the assumption that the Go¨del number of a formula is the sequence of Go¨del
numbers of the symbols in the formula this is true.
Definition 3.8. A set Σ ⊆M is a partial satisfaction class if there exists c ∈M\ω
such that
〈M,Σ〉  ∀x
(
x ∈ Σ→ Sent(x)
)
∧ ∀ϕ<c ∀xΨ(Σ, ϕ[x/v] ).1
A partial satisfaction class is inductive if full induction in the language LA∪{ Σ }
holds, i.e., if
〈M,Σ〉  ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))
)
→ ∀xϕ(x)
for every LM ∪ { Σ }-formula ϕ(x).
Proposition 3.9. If ϕ is an LM-sentence and Σ a partial satisfaction class then
ϕ ∈ Σ iff M  ϕ.
1See Definition 3.31 for the definition of ϕ[a/v].
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Proof. For atomic sentences ϕ the proposition follows trivial from the definition
of partial satisfaction classes. The rest is an easy induction on the construction of
ϕ.
Theorem 3.10. Every countable recursively saturated model M of PA admits an
inductive partial satisfaction class.
Proof. Since M is countable and recursively saturated it is resplendent. Therefore
we only need to show that the theory
ElDiag(M)
+
{
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))
)
→ ∀xϕ(x) ϕ(x) an LM ∪ { Σ }-formula
}
+ ∀x
(
x ∈ Σ→ Sent(x)
)
+ { ∀xΨ(Σ, ϕ[x/v]) ϕ an LA-formula }
is consistent. If this theory is consistent then clearly any Σ satisfying it will be an
inductive partial satisfaction class by a simple overspill argument since
∀n∈ω 〈M,Σ〉  ∀x<n ∀xΨ(Σ, ϕ[x/v]).
To prove the consistency take a finite subset of the theory, it will at most
involve a finite number of standard formulas ϕ in the scheme
∀xΨ(Σ, ϕ[x/v]).
Since it is a finite number they will all be Σk for some k ∈ ω, therefore we can
define
Σ =df { a ∈M M  TrΣk(a) } .
Theorem 3.11. If M  PA is a nonstandard model admitting an inductive partial
satisfaction class Σ then M is recursively saturated.
Proof. Suppose p(x) is a recursive type in M and a¯ ∈ M are the parameters of
the type. The type, being recursive, is coded by some b ∈M. Since
∀k∈ω 〈M,Σ〉  ∃x∀ϕ<k
(
ϕ ∈ b→ ϕ
[
[x, a¯]/v
]
∈ Σ
)
we can use overspill (it is here we are using that Σ is inductive) and get
〈M,Σ〉  ∃x∀ϕ<c
(
ϕ ∈ b→ ϕ
[
[x, a¯]/v
]
∈ Σ
)
for some c ∈M \ ω. This gives us an x ∈M realizing p(x).
Remark 3.12. We are going to do the same sort of argument when Σ does not
satisfy induction. The argument there involves more work.
Combining these two theorems we get the following.
Theorem 3.13. A nonstandard countable model of PA is recursively saturated iff
it admits an inductive partial satisfaction class.
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3.2 Construction of satisfaction classes
We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14 ([KKL81]). If M is countable and recursively saturated then M
admits a satisfaction class.
To prove it we will define a logic, called M-logic, which we will prove to be
consistent (if M is recursively saturated). Then we construct a maximally consis-
tent set of sentences in this logic, which turns out to be a satisfaction class. The
idea to use M-logic is due to Jeff Paris.
3.2.1 M-logic
As formulas in this logic we will consider all ∗LM-sentences. We will consider
a formal deduction system that derives actually finite sets of formulas, usually
denoted by upper case Greek letters. The intention is that the set Γ should be
read as
∨
Γ, i.e., the disjunction of the sentences in Γ. The symbol ϕ will denote
the singleton set { ϕ } and Γ, ϕ will denote Γ∪{ ϕ }. The axioms for the deductive
system are:
ϕ,¬ϕ (Axiom1)
ca 6= cb if a 6= b (Axiom2)
t = t (Axiom3)
t 6= r, r = t (Axiom4)
t 6= r, r 6= s, t = s (Axiom5)
t 6= r, S(t) = S(r) (Axiom6)
t 6= t′, r 6= r′, t+ r = t′ + r′ (Axiom7)
t 6= t′, r 6= r′, t · r = t′ · r′ (Axiom8)
S(ca) = cSM(a) (Axiom9)
ca + cb = ca+Mb (Axiom10)
ca · cb = ca·Mb (Axiom11)
∃v0(t = v0) (Axiom12)
where ϕ is an arbitrary ∗LM-sentence and t, r and s are arbitrary closed
∗LM-
terms. The inference rules are the following:
Γ
Γ, ϕ
(Weak)
Γ, ϕ
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ
(∨I1)
Γ, ψ
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ
(∨I2)
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Γ,¬ϕ Γ,¬ψ
Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∨I3)
Γ, ϕ
Γ,¬¬ϕ
(¬I)
Γ, ϕ Γ,¬ϕ
Γ
(Cut)
Γ, ϕ[ca/vi]
Γ, ∃vi ϕ
(∃I)
. . . Γ,¬ϕ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
Γ,¬∃vi ϕ
(M-rule)
where Γ is an arbitrary finite set of ∗LM-sentences, ϕ is an arbitrary
∗LM-sentence
and the premises in M-rule means Γ,¬ϕ[ca/vi] for all a ∈M.
It might be worth noticing that it is only Axiom2, Axiom9, Axiom10, Axiom11
and M-rule that depends on the model M.
At a first glance Axiom12 seems to be an ugly duckling, but it turns out to be
of great importance. We will discuss its importance in Chapter 4.
Observe the connection with ω-logic: the logic we get by replacing M-rule with
. . . Γ, ϕ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
Γ, ∀vi ϕ
is essentially equivalent to M-logic.
The definition of a proof follows the usual one. A proof is a tree where the nodes
are finite sets of sentences, the leaves are axioms and the root is the conclusion
and each edge from one node to another follows one of the inference rules. For
example;
Axiom2
ϕ,¬ϕ
ϕ, ψ,¬ϕ
Weak
Axiom2
ψ,¬ψ
ϕ, ψ,¬ψ
Weak
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ϕ, ψ
∨I3
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ϕ, ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I2
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I1
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∨ ϕ), ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I2
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∨ ϕ)
∨I1
is a proof of the commutativity of ∨, i.e., of (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ψ ∨ ϕ). Figure 3.1 shows
the corresponding tree.
The notation ⊢p
M
Γ will mean that p is a proof in M-logic with conclusion Γ
and ⊢
M
Γ means that there is a proof p such that ⊢p
M
Γ. Please observe that the
proofs are external objects and might not be definable in M, they are either finite
or infinite trees.
If Λ is a (external, finite or infinite) set of ∗LM-sentences then Λ ⊢
p
M
Γ means
that p is a proof of Γ in M-logic with the added axioms
ϕ if ϕ ∈ Λ. (AxiomΛ)
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ϕ,¬ϕ
Weak
ψ,¬ψ
Weak
ϕ, ψ,¬ϕ
∨I3
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
ϕ, ψ,¬ψ
∨I3
kk
kk
kk
kk
kk
kk
kk
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ϕ, ψ
∨I2
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ϕ, ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I1
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I2
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∨ ϕ), ψ ∨ ϕ
∨I1
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∨ ϕ)
Figure 3.1: The tree form of the proof of (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ψ ∨ ϕ).
22 Satisfaction classes
Λ ⊢
M
Γ means that there is a proof p such that Λ ⊢p
M
Γ.
If Λ ⊢p
M
Γ then |p| denotes the height of p which is the height of p looked on as
a tree, or in other words;
Definition 3.15. The height, |p|, of a proof p is defined as follows; if p is an axiom
then |p| = 0, if the last inference rule in p is of the form
p1
Γ1
p2
Γ2 . . .
pi
Γi . . .
Γ
(there are either one, two or infinitely many premises) then
|p| = sup
i
(|pi|+ 1).
The height |p| is an ordinal number in the “real world.” By theM-rule |p|might
be infinite. For example Figure 3.2 shows a proof of height ω. As we will see later,
the question of whether there are sets Γ provable in M-logic but not provable by
a proof of finite height is equivalent to the question if M-logic is consistent.
If α is an ordinal number then Λ ⊢α
M
Γ means that there is a proof p such that
|p| < α and Λ ⊢p
M
Γ, e.g., ⊢ω
M
Γ means that there is a finite height proof of Γ.
As an alternative we may define
⊢αM Γ iff Γ ∈ Iα
where I1 is the set of axioms of M-logic,
Iα+1 = { Γ Γ is the result of applying one of the inference rules to sets in Iα }
and
Iλ =
⋃
α<λ
Iα
for limit ordinals λ. Then we could have defined ⊢
M
Γ to hold if there exists an
ordinal α such that ⊢α
M
Γ. This alternative definition avoids mentioning trees,
simplifying things.
Lemma 3.16. Let Λ be an arbitrary set of ∗LM-sentences and ∆ and Γ be finite
sets of ∗LM-sentences. Then
1. Λ,∆ ⊢
M
Γ iff Λ ⊢
M
¬∆,Γ where ¬∆ = { ¬ϕ ϕ ∈ ∆ }.
2. Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ iff Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ, ψ.
3. Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ iff Λ ⊢
M
Γ,¬¬ϕ.
Proof. 1. If ∆ = ∅, the lemma is trivial. Suppose ∆ = { ϕ }, then if Λ ⊢
M
¬ϕ,Γ it
is clear that Λ, ϕ ⊢
M
¬ϕ,Γ and Λ, ϕ ⊢
M
ϕ,Γ (by AxiomΛ and Weak) so by Cut we
get Λ, ϕ ⊢
M
Γ.
3
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3
Axiom3
ca0 = ca0
¬ca0 6= ca0
Axiom3
ca1 = ca1
ca1 = ca1 , ϕ
Axiom3
ca1 = ca1
ca1 = ca1 ,¬ϕ
ca1 = ca1
¬ca1 6= ca1
Axiom3
ca2 = ca2
ca2 = ca2 , ϕ
Axiom3
ca2 = ca2
ca2 = ca2 ,¬ϕ
ca2 = ca2
ca2 = ca2 , ϕ
Axiom3
ca2 = ca2
ca2 = ca2 ,¬ϕ
ca2 = ca2
¬ca2 6= ca2 . . .
¬∃v1(v1 6= v1)
Figure 3.2: An example of a proof of height ω. Here {ai}i∈ω is an enumeration of the domain of M and ϕ is, for example,
ca0 = ca0 .
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On the other hand assume that
Λ, ϕ ⊢p
M
Γ.
We will do induction on |p|; if |p| = 0 then Γ is an axiom, if Γ 6= { ϕ } it is clear
that Λ ⊢
M
Γ,¬ϕ by Weak and if Γ = { ϕ } then Γ,¬ϕ is Axiom1.
If |p| > 1 then the last inference in p is of the form
Γ0 Γ1 . . .
Γ
and by the induction hypothesis we know that Λ ⊢
M
Γi,¬ϕ, so by the inference
Γ0,¬ϕ Γ1,¬ϕ . . .
Γ,¬ϕ
we get Λ ⊢
M
Γ,¬ϕ.
To prove the statement in the general case when |∆| > 1 we iterate, moving
one formula at a time by induction on |∆|.
2. Suppose Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ, ψ, then by ∨I1 Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ∨ψ, ψ and by ∨I2 Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ∨ψ.
If Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ then by Axiom1
Λ ⊢M Γ, ϕ, ψ,¬ϕ and Λ ⊢M Γ, ϕ, ψ,¬ψ,
so by ∨3-rule we have Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ, ψ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) and then by Weak and Cut we get
Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ, ψ.
3. One direction is ¬I. Suppose Λ ⊢
M
Γ,¬¬ϕ, then by Weak we have
Λ ⊢M Γ, ϕ,¬¬ϕ
and by using Axiom1 and Weak we get
Λ ⊢M Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ,
so, finally, Cut gives us Λ ⊢
M
Γ, ϕ.
Definition 3.17. If Γ is a set of ∗LM-sentences, then it is said to be consistent in
M-logic if Γ 0
M
∅.
Proposition 3.18. If Γ is a set of ∗LM-sentences then the following statements
are equivalent:
1. Γ is consistent in M-logic.
2. There exists a ∗LM-sentence ϕ such that Γ 0M ϕ.
3. For all ∗LM-sentences ϕ either Γ 0M ϕ or Γ 0M ¬ϕ.
3.2 Construction of satisfaction classes 25
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2. Suppose Γ proves all ∗LM-sentences. Let ϕ be any such, then
Γ ⊢
M
ϕ and Γ ⊢
M
¬ϕ. By Cut Γ ⊢
M
∅, i.e., Γ is inconsistent.
2⇒ 3. Suppose there is a ∗LM-sentence ϕ such that Γ ⊢M ϕ and Γ ⊢M ¬ϕ then
by Cut Γ ⊢
M
∅ and so by Weak Γ ⊢
M
ψ for any ∗LM-sentence ψ.
3 ⇒ 1. Suppose Γ is inconsistent; by Weak Γ proves every ∗LM-sentence, so
there certainly exists a ∗LM-sentence ϕ such that Γ ⊢M ϕ and Γ ⊢M ¬ϕ.
It follows from Lemma 3.16 that if Γ is consistent (in M-logic) and ϕ is a
∗LM-sentence then Γ, ϕ or Γ,¬ϕ is consistent (in M-logic).
Proposition 3.19. If ϕ ∈ ElDiag(M) then ⊢
M
ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of ϕ.
First we prove that if t is any closed LM-term and
M  t = ca then ⊢M t = ca.
This is done by induction on the construction of t. The base case, when t is a
constant, follows from Axiom3. We prove the case when t is r+ s for some closed
terms r and s. Let b, d ∈M be such that
M  r = cb ∧ s = cd ∧ b+ d = a.
By the induction hypothesis ⊢
M
r = cb and ⊢M s = cd, so by Axiom7 ⊢M t = cb+ cd
and by Axiom10 and Axiom5 ⊢
M
t = ca. The other cases, when t is S(r) or r · s
are similar.
Now we prove, by induction on the construction of ϕ, that
if M  ϕ then ⊢M ϕ and
if M 2 ϕ then ⊢M ¬ϕ.
For the base case, when ϕ is an atomic sentence, assume first that M  t = r.
Then, clearly, M  t = ca ∧ r = ca for some a ∈ M. By the fact proved above
⊢
M
t = ca and ⊢M r = ca, and by using Axiom3 and Axiom4 by get ⊢M t = r.
If M  t 6= r then M  t = ca ∧ r = cb for some a 6= b ∈ M. The formal
deduction of t 6= r from t = ca; r = cb and ca 6= cb is written out in Figure 3.3 as
an illustration of a M-logic proof.
For the inductive step we only handle the case when ϕ is ψ ∨ σ, the others are
similar and easy. Assume M  ψ ∨ σ then M  ψ or M  σ so by the induction
hypothesis we have ⊢
M
ψ or ⊢
M
σ. In either case ⊢
M
ψ ∨ σ by ∨I1 or ∨I2.
On the other hand ifM 2 ψ∨σ then M 2 ψ andM 2 σ. Thus, by the induction
hypothesis ⊢
M
¬ψ and ⊢
M
¬σ. An application of ∨I3 yields ⊢
M
¬(ψ ∨ σ).
3.2.2 Soundness and completeness
If Γ = { γ1, γ2, . . . , γk } is a finite set of ∗LM-sentences, let
∨
Γ be
γ1 ∨ (γ2 ∨ (. . . ∨ γk))
2
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Axiom5
ca = cb, r 6= cb, ca 6= r
t 6= r, ca = cb, r 6= cb, ca 6= r
Axiom5
t 6= r, ca = r, ca 6= t
Axiom4
ca = t, t 6= ca t = ca
ca = t
t 6= r, ca = t
t 6= r, ca = r, ca = t
t 6= r, ca = r
t 6= r, ca = cb, ca = r
t 6= r, ca = cb, r 6= cb, ca = r
t 6= r, ca = cb, r 6= cb
r = cb
t 6= r, r = cb
t 6= r, ca = cb, r = cb
t 6= r, ca = cb
Axiom2
ca 6= cb
t 6= r, ca 6= cb
t 6= r
Figure 3.3: A proof of t 6= r from the hypothesis t = ca; r = cb and a 6= b.
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if Γ is nonempty and 0 6= 0 if Γ is empty.2 If Σ is a satisfaction class then
∨
Γ ∈ Σ
iff γi ∈ Σ for some 1 6 i 6 k. Please note that this is independent on the
numbering of the set Γ.
Proposition 3.20 (Soundness of M-logic). If ⊢
M
Γ and Σ is a satisfaction
class then
∨
Γ ∈ Σ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the height of the proof p of Γ. If |p| = 0 then
Γ is an axiom:
Axiom1: If Γ is ψ,¬ψ, it is clear that ψ ∨ ¬ψ ∈ Σ due to the definition of
satisfaction classes.
Axiom2: If a 6= b then ca 6= cb ∈ Σ by (3.2).
Axiom3: If Γ is t = t then t = t ∈ Σ by (3.3).
Axiom4: This is (3.4).
Axiom5: This is (3.5).
Axiom6: If Γ is t 6= r, S(t) = S(r) we have to prove that t 6= r∨S(t) = S(r) ∈ Σ
or equivalent that if t = r ∈ Σ then S(t) = S(r) ∈ Σ. If t = r ∈ Σ let a be such
that t = ca ∈ Σ and r = ca ∈ Σ. We have S(t) = cb ∈ Σ and S(r) = cb ∈ Σ, where
b = SM(a), by (3.6). Thus, by (3.3)-(3.5), S(t) = S(r) ∈ Σ.
Axiom7: As above but use (3.7) instead of (3.6).
Axiom8: As above but use (3.8) instead of (3.6).
Axiom9, Axiom10, Axiom11: Directly from Proposition 3.4.
Axiom12: ∃v0(t = v0) ∈ Σ since by (3.3) we have t = t ∈ Σ and by (3.9) there
exists a ∈M such that t = ca ∈ Σ and so ∃v0(t = v0) ∈ Σ by (3.12).
For the inductive step we prove that all the inference rules are sound in the sense
that if all disjunctions of the premises of an inference rule are in in a satisfaction
class then so is the disjunction of the conclusion. This is easy to see for the first
six rules. We prove it only for ∃I and M-rule.
∃I: Suppose
∨
Λ ∨ ψ[ca/vi] ∈ Σ; then we can assume that
ψ[ca/vi] ∈ Σ
since otherwise
∨
Λ ∈ Σ and
∨
Λ ∨ ∃vi ψ ∈ Σ. Thus, by (3.1), ∃vi ψ ∈ Σ and so∨
Λ ∨ ∃vi ψ ∈ Σ.
M-rule: Suppose
∨
Λ ∨ ¬ψ[ca/vi] ∈ Σ for all a ∈M. We can assume
¬ψ[ca/vi] ∈ Σ
for all a ∈M. If ¬∃vi ψ /∈ Σ then ∃vi ψ ∈ Σ and then ψ[ca/vi] ∈ Σ for some a ∈M
by (3.1), and we have a contradiction.
Remark 3.21. There is a stronger version of the proposition: If Λ ⊢
M
Γ and Σ is a
satisfaction class extending the set Λ, i.e., Λ ⊆ Σ, then
∨
Γ ∈ Σ.
2We will later redefine
∨
Γ so that it does not depend on the numbering of the set by choosing
a canonical numbering.
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Suppose M is countable and the set Λ is a set of ∗LM-sentences which is
consistent (e.g., if M-logic is consistent itself we can choose Λ to be the empty
set). We will construct a satisfaction class including Λ. The construction is very
much as the completeness theorem for first-order logic.
Let { ϕi }
∞
i=1 be an enumeration of all
∗LM-sentences and let Γ0 = Λ. Define
the sequence { Γi }
∞
i=0 of consistent sets of
∗LM-sentences recursively as follows.
We know that if Γi is consistent then either Γi, ϕi+1 or Γi,¬ϕi+1 is consistent.
Choose Γi+1 to be the one which is consistent with the extra condition that if ϕi+1
is ∃vj ψ for some ∗LM-formula ψ and we choose Γi+1 to be Γi, ∃vj ψ then we also
put ψ[ca/vj] in Γi+1 in such a way that this new set is consistent. We can always
do this, because otherwise we would have
Γi, ∃vj ψ ⊢M ¬ψ[ca/vj ]
for all a ∈M, but then
Γi, ∃vj ψ ⊢M ¬∃vj ψ
by M-rule so by Cut Γi, ∃vi ψ ⊢M ∅ contradicting the fact that Γi, ∃vi ψ is consis-
tent.
Let
Γ∞ =
⋃
Γi.
Lemma 3.22. Γ∞ is a maximally consistent set of
∗LM-sentences.
Proof. It is clearly maximal from the construction: for every sentence ϕ we have
ϕ ∈ Γ∞ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ∞. To prove the consistency of Γ∞ we first notice that by the
construction there is no sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Γ∞ and ¬ϕ ∈ Γ∞. Then we
observe that for all rules with finitely many premises if the premises are in Γ∞
then the conclusion is too. This is easy to see since all the premises are in some
Γn. Assume now that ¬ϕ[ca/vi] ∈ Γ∞ for all a ∈ M and that ∃v0 ϕ ∈ Γ∞, by
the construction we have ϕ[ca/vi] ∈ Γ∞ for some a which is a contradiction. We
have proved that Γ∞ is closed under all the inference rules so since there is no
∗LM-sentence ϕ ∈ Γ∞ such that ¬ϕ ∈ Γ∞, Γ∞ is consistent.
Proposition 3.23. Σ is a maximally consistent set of ∗LM-sentences iff Σ is a
satisfaction class.
Proof. If Σ is a satisfaction class we can prove the consistency and the maximality
very much as in Lemma 3.22. We prove the converse.
Assume Σ is a maximally consistent set of ∗LM-sentences. We will use Propo-
sition 3.6 to prove that Σ is a satisfaction class. First we have to prove that ∼ is
an equivalence relation; Axiom3, Axiom4 and Axiom5 takes care of that. Axiom6,
Axiom7 and Axiom8 takes care of the well-definability of MΣ. The canonical map
f : M → MΣ is an embedding by Axiom2, Axiom9, Axiom10 and Axiom11, f is
surjective by Axiom12.
Adding up the results in this section we get the following:
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Proposition 3.24. If Λ is a set of ∗LM-sentences then there is a satisfaction class
Σ such that Λ ⊆ Σ iff Λ 0
M
∅.
Remark 3.25. We can define Λ 
M
Γ for sets of ∗LM-sentences Γ and Λ, where Γ
is finite, to hold iff
∨
Γ is included in every satisfaction class extending Λ. Then
Proposition 3.24 can be reformulated as
Λ ⊢M Γ iff Λ M Γ.
Finally, we add a small remark for the confused reader.
Remark 3.26. Even though by definition a consistent set Γ is maximally consistent
in a logic if for every sentence or formula ϕ /∈ Γ, the set Γ∪{ ϕ } is inconsistent; in a
logic where the deduction theorem holds a consistent set Γ is maximally consistent
iff for all sentences or formulas ϕ either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
3.2.3 The height of proofs
The next result is about recursively saturated models. This is the only time we
use the recursive saturation in this chapter. It tells us that in recursively saturated
models we can prove everything provable in M-logic with proofs of finite height.
Proposition 3.27. If Λ is an LM-definable set of
∗LM-sentences, Λ ⊢M Γ and M
is recursively saturated then Λ ⊢ω
M
Γ.
Proof. Let λ(x) define Λ. We will recursively define formulas Pfk(x), k > 1 such
that
M  Pfk(a) iff Λ ⊢
k
M Γ,
where a is a code for the finite set Γ.
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Let Pf1(x) be
∀z
(
z ∈ x→ Sent(z)
)
∧
[
∃y
(
Sent(y) ∧ x = { y } ∧ λ(y)
)
∨ ∃y
(
Sent(y) ∧ x = { y, ¬y }
)
∨ ∃y
(
x = { cy = cy }
)
∨ ∃y, z
(
x =
{
cy 6= cz
}
∧ y 6= z
)
∨ ∃y
(
ClTerm(y) ∧ x = { y = y }
)
∨ ∃y, z
(
ClTerm(y) ∧ ClTerm(z) ∧ x =
{
y 6= z , z = y
} )
∨ ∃y, z, w
(
ClTerm(y) ∧ ClTerm(w)∧ ClTerm(z)∧
x =
{
y 6= z , z 6= w , y = w
})
∨ ∃y, z
(
ClTerm(y) ∧ x =
{
y 6= cz , S(y) = S(cz)
})
∨ ∃y, z, w, v
(
ClTerm(y)∧ ClTerm(z)∧
x =
{
y 6= cw , z 6= cv , y + z = cw + cv
})
∨ ∃y, z, w, v
(
ClTerm(y)∧ ClTerm(z)∧
x =
{
y 6= cw , z 6= cv , y · z = cw · cv
})
∨ ∃y
(
ClTerm(y) ∧ x =
{
∃v0(y = v0)
})]
And let Pfk+1(x) (k > 1) be
∃y, z
(
Sent(z) ∧ Pfk(y) ∧ x = y ∪ { z }
)
∨ ∃y, z, w
(
Sent(z) ∧ Sent(w) ∧ Pfk(y ∪ { z }) ∧ x = y ∪ { z ∨ w }
)
∨ ∃y, z, w
(
Sent(z) ∧ Sent(w) ∧ Pfk(y ∪ { w }) ∧ x = y ∪ { z ∨ w }
)
∨ ∃y, z, w
(
Sent(z) ∧ Sent(w) ∧ Pfk(y ∪ { ¬z })∧ Pfk(y ∪ { ¬w })∧
x = y ∪
{
¬(z ∨ w)
})
∨∃y, z
(
Sent(z) ∧ Pfk(y ∪ { z }) ∧ x = y ∪ { ¬¬z }
)
∨ ∃z
(
Sent(z) ∧ Pfk(x ∪ { z }) ∧ Pfk(x ∪ { ¬z })
)
∨ ∃y, z, w, i
(
Sent( ∃vi z ) ∧ Pfk(y ∪
{
z[cw/vi]
}
) ∧ x = y ∪
{
∃vi z
})
∨ ∃y, z, i(Sent( ¬∃vi z ) ∧ ∀w Pfk(y ∪
{
¬z[cw/vi]
}
) ∧ x = y ∪
{
¬∃vi z
}
).
Observe that if a ∈M is code for a finite set of ∗LM-sentences Γ andM  Pfk(a)
then |Γ| 6 k + 2.
Suppose the lemma is false and let
A = { Γ Λ ⊢M Γ and Λ 0
ω
M Γ }
and
B = { p p is a proof from Λ of Γ for some Γ ∈ A } .
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Let p ∈ B be of smallest height, i.e., such that if q ∈ B then |p| 6 |q|. All the
subproofs of p must be of finite height, so it is clear that |p| = ω and that the last
inference rule in p is M-rule:
. . . ∆,¬ϕ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
∆,¬∃vi ϕ
Let a ∈M be a code for ∆ and define
q(x) =
{
¬ Pfk
(
a ∪
{
¬ϕ[cx/vi]
})
k > 1
}
.
It should be clear that q(x) is a recursive type so, by recursive saturation, it is
realized by some b ∈M. We therefore have
0ωM ∆,¬ϕ[cb/vi],
which contradicts the fact that the height of p is ω.
Remark 3.28. In Proposition 3.27 we do not need Λ to be definable, we only need
the expanded structure 〈M,Λ〉 to be recursively saturated for the proof to work.
3.3 The inconsistency of M-logic
In this section we prove that if M admits a satisfaction class then M is recursively
saturated (without any restriction on the cardinality of M). We will also mention
a strengthening of this result by Smith.
Please do compare the next theorem (and proof) with Theorem 3.11.
Theorem 3.29 ([Lac81]). Let M be an arbitrary nonstandard model of PA ad-
mitting a satisfaction class then M is recursively saturated.
Proof. Let Σ be a satisfaction class on M and assume M is not recursively satu-
rated. Let
{ ϕi(x) }i∈ω
be a non-realized recursive type. We can assume that
M ∀x
(
ϕi+1(x)→ ϕi(x)
)
,
M ∃x
(
¬ϕi+1(x) ∧ ϕi(x)
)
and
M ∀xϕ0(x),
for all i ∈ ω. If not, we can replace the formulas ϕi by ϕ′i where
ϕ′0(x) is x = x and
ϕ′i+1(x) is ϕ
′
i(x) ∧ ϕi(x) ∧ ∃y<xϕ
′
i(y).
Let
αi(x) be ¬ϕi+1(x) ∧ ϕi(x) for all i ∈ ω
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and
Ai = { a ∈M M  αi(a) } .
It should be clear that {Ai }i∈ω is a partition of M.
We will recursively define a sequence { βi(x) }i6ν of formulas. Let β0(x) be
α0(x) and if βi(x) is defined let θij be
∃x
(
βi(x) ∧ αj(x)
)
and βi+1(x) be(
¬∃yβi(y) ∧ α0(x)
)
∨
(
∃y βi(y) ∧
(
θi0 ∧ α1(x)
)
∨
[
¬θi0
∧
(
θi1 ∧ α2(x)
)
∨
[
¬θi1
∧
(
θi2 ∧ α3(x)
)
∨
[
¬θi2
...
∧
(
θii ∧ αi+1(x)
)
· · ·
]]])
.
The sequence βi(x) is recursive and therefore coded in M and so extendable to
a nonstandard ν ∈M \ ω, so that the recursive definition holds for all i < ν. Let
Bi = { a ∈M βi[ca/vj ] ∈ Σ }
for all i 6 ν, where vj is the free variable in βi(x).
The idea of the definitions of the βis is that
Bi+1 =
{
A0 if Bi = ∅
Ak+1 otherwise, where k = (µn∈ω)Bi ∩An 6= ∅.
Since a satisfaction class is able to “look” finitely deep into a formula we can prove
the following properties of the sequence {Bi }i6ν :
Bi = Ak ⇒ Bi+1 = Ak+1 for all i 6 ν and k ∈ ω (3.13)
by the recursive definition of βi(x), and
∀i6ν ∃k∈ω Bi = Ak (3.14)
since B0 = A0 and if i > 0 then either Bi−1 is the empty set, in which case Bi is
A0, or Bi−1 is not empty and then there is a least k ∈ ω such that Bi−1 intersects
Ak (since {Ai }i∈ω is a partition of M) and then Bi is Ak+1.
Let us now finally define the (external) function f : I<ν → ω such that f(i) = k
iff Bi = Ak. By the property (3.14) this is a total function and by property (3.13)
f(i+ 1) = f(i) + 1, so the sequence
f(ν) > f(ν − 1) > f(ν − 2) > . . .
is a strictly decreasing infinite sequence of natural numbers, which contradicts the
well-ordering of the natural numbers. Hence there could not be a non-realized
recursive type and therefore M is recursively saturated.
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There is a somewhat stronger version of the theorem:
Theorem 3.30 ([Smi84]). If M-logic is consistent then M is recursively satu-
rated.
Proof. The proof is by modifying the proof of Lachlan’s result; defining the sets
Bi by provability in M-logic instead of by satisfaction classes, see [Smi84] for the
details.
Please observe that whenM is countableM admits a satisfaction class precisely
when M-logic is consistent, so the result of Smith is a strengthening of Lachlan’s
result only when M is uncountable.
3.4 The consistency of M-logic
3.4.1 Template logic
In Section 3.2 we proved that M-logic is consistent iff we can find a satisfaction
class for the model (assuming M is countable). In this section we prove that for
any recursively saturated model of PA M-logic is consistent.
Together with the results in Section 3.3 above we get that a countable non-
standard model of PA admits a satisfaction class iff it is recursively saturated.
The question is; if M is recursively saturated how do we prove the consistency
of M-logic? Proving consistency of a logic can be done, mainly, in two different
ways; the proof theoretic way, by a cut-elimination theorem, or the model theoretic
way, by a soundness theorem. We will use the model theoretic approach and prove
a soundness theorem. For this we will define a new kind of logic. The idea is
really easy; instead of studying nonstandard formulas we are going to replace
some subformulas and subterms in the nonstandard formula with templates, and
in this way study formulas of finite depth.
We will call this logic template logic, it is first-order logic with template symbols
added. Each ∗LM-formula and
∗LM-term has a corresponding template symbol.
These symbols may be looked on as predicates and functions of nonstandard finite
arity. For example, the template symbol corresponding to the ∗LM-formula
v0 = v0 ∨ v1 = v1 ∨ . . . ∨ va = va
could be treated as a predicate of arity a, even if a > ω.
Let LT be the language
LM ∪ { ϕ̂ ϕ is a
∗
LM-formula } ∪
{
t̂ t is a ∗LM-terms
}
where ϕ̂ is treated as 0-ary relational symbols (i.e., propositional variables) and t̂
is treated as constant symbols when building up terms and formulas. For technical
reasons we include the variables { va a ∈M } in the language LT.
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The formulas and terms of template logic are defined in the usual way with
template symbols being 0-ary. The free variables of a term is defined in a non-
standard way as follows
FV(ca) =df ∅
FV(vi) =df { vi }
FV( t̂ ) =df { a ∈M M  a ∈ FV(t) }
FV(S(r)) =df FV(r)
FV(r + s) =df FV(r) ∪ FV(s)
FV(r · s) =df FV(r) ∪ FV(s)
Observe that in the third clause FV has two different meanings, in the second
appearance it is the function definable in PA. And of a formula as
FV(r = s) =df FV(r) ∪ FV(s)
FV(ϕ̂) =df { a ∈M M  a ∈ FV(ϕ) }
FV(¬γ) =df FV(γ)
FV(γ ∨ δ) =df FV(γ) ∪ FV(δ)
FV(∃vi γ) =df FV(γ) \ { vi }
We call a formula γ a sentence if FV(γ) = ∅ and a term t closed if FV(t) = ∅.
Substitution is also defined in a nonstandard way; for terms
cb[ca/vi] is cb
vj [ca/vi] is
{
ca if i = j
vj otherwise
t̂ [ca/vi] is ̂t[ca/vi]
S(r)[ca/vi] is S(r[ca/vi])
(r + s)[ca/vi] is r[ca/vi] + s[ca/vi]
(r · s)[ca/vi] is r[ca/vi] · s[ca/vi]
and for formulas
(r = s)[ca/vi] is r[ca/vi] = s[ca/vi]
ϕ̂[ca/vi] is ϕ̂[ca/vi]
(¬γ)[ca/vi] is ¬(γ[ca/vi])
(γ ∨ δ)[ca/vi] is γ[ca/vi] ∨ δ[ca/vi]
∃vi γ[ca/vj] is
{
∃vi(γ[ca/vj ]) if i 6= j
∃vi γ otherwise.
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Definition 3.31. If ϕ is a ∗LM-formula and a ∈M then ϕ[a/v] is
ϕ[c[a]i1−1, . . . , c[a]ik−1/vi1 , . . . , vik ]
where { i1, . . . , ik } = { i ∈M [a]i 6= 0 }. We define t[a/v], for terms t, in the
obvious similar way.
Definition 3.32. The relation (between ∗LM-formulas) ϕ ∼= ψ holds if there exists
a ∗LM-formula γ and a, b ∈M such that γ[a/v] is ϕ and γ[b/v] is ψ. The relation
between ∗LM-terms t ∼= r holds if there exists a ∗LM-term s and a, b ∈ M such
that s[a/v] is t and s[b/v] is r.
Proposition 3.33. The relation ∼= is an equivalence relation on the set of ∗LM-
formulas and ∗LM-terms.
Proof. The reflexive and symmetric properties are trivial, only the transitive prop-
erty involves some work. We prove the proposition for terms, the case with for-
mulas is similar.
Let us assume that t ∼= r and r ∼= s, and prove t ∼= s. The proof is by induction
on r inside PA; we use the inductive property of Term(x). If r is a constant or a
variable then t and s are also either constants or variables. In any case t ∼= s since
any constant is related to any constant or variable and a variable is related to a
variable iff they are equal.
For the inductive step the case when r is of the form S(r′) is easy and the two
cases when r is r1 + r2 or r1 · r2 are similar, therefore we only handle the case
when r is r1 + r2.
It is easy to see that t and s also are of this form, i.e., t is t1 + t2 and s is
s1 + s2. Let p, q, at, ar, br, and bs be such that
t = p[at/v], r = p[ar/v], r = q[br/v] and s = q[bs/v]
and let p be p1 + p2 and q be q1 + q2. Clearly,
ti = pi[at/v], ri = pi[ar/v], ri = qi[br/v] and si = qi[bs/v]
for i = 1, 2, therefore ti ∼= ri and ri ∼= si. Thus, by the induction hypothesis
ti ∼= si. Let oi, ait and ais be such that
ti = oi[ait/v] and si = oi[ais/v].
We have to “unify” ait and ais in such a way that the results, at and as, work
for both is, i.e., such that ti = o
′
i[at/v] and si = o
′
i[as/v], where oi are some new
terms. Then clearly t = (o′1 + o
′
2)[at/v] and s = (o1 + o2)[as/v] so t
∼= s.
To make this happen let o′1 be o1 and let i0 ∈ M be bigger than all indices of
free variables of o1 and all is such that
[a1t]i 6= 0 or [a1s]i 6= 0.
36 Satisfaction classes
Let o′2 be as o2 except that if vi occurs as a free variable in o2 and [a2t]i 6= 0 it is
substituted by vi+i0 . Finally, define at and as such that
[at]i = [a1t]i and
[as]i = [a1s]i
for all i < i0 and
[at]i+i0 = [a2t]i and
[as]i+i0 = [a2s]i
for all i ∈M. Clearly, ti = o′i[at/v] and si = o
′
i[as/v] for i = 1, 2.
So far, so good; we have a new logic to play with (even though we have not
defined the axioms and inference rules yet). But how does template logic connect
with M-logic, the object of study? For the connection to work we need a way
to approximate a ∗LM-formula or a
∗LM-term with a template formula or term.
Given a ∗LM-formula you can, by replacing some of the subformulas and subterms
with corresponding template symbols, e.g., replacing the subformula ϕ by ϕ̂, make
an LT-formula. This is the idea behind approximations.
If ψ is an LT-formula and δ a
∗LM-formula we define Fδ(ψ) to be ψ with all
occurrences of symbols ϕ̂, for ϕ ∼= δ, replaced by
t̂1 = t̂2 if ϕ is t1 = t2
¬γ̂ if ϕ is ¬γ
γ̂ ∨ σ̂ if ϕ is γ ∨ σ
∃vi γ̂ if ϕ is ∃vi γ
and we define Fr(ψ), where r is a
∗LM-term, to be ψ with all occurrences of
symbols t̂, for t ∼= r, replaced by
vi if t is vi
ca if t is ca
S(r̂) if t is S(r)
r̂ + ŝ if t is r + s
r̂ · ŝ if t is r · s.
Now, the definition of an approximation.
Definition 3.34. An LT-formula (or LT-term) ψ is an approximation of another
LT-formula (or LT-term) δ if there exists
∗LM-formulas or -terms τ1, . . . , τk such
that
δ = Fτk ◦Fτk−1 ◦ . . . ◦Fτ1(ψ).
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If
F = Fτk ◦Fτk−1 ◦ . . . ◦Fτ1
we call F an approximating function and say that the length of F , denoted |F |,
is k. We say that ψ is an approximation of a ∗LM-formula ϕ if ψ is F (ϕ̂), for
some approximating function F .
We define approximations of finite sets of formulas by letting
F (∆) = {F (δ) δ ∈ ∆ } .
Finally, for convenience, we define F (ϕ), where ϕ is a ∗LM-sentence, to be
F (ϕ̂).
The formal proof system for template logic as just like the one for M-logic, but
for completeness we write it down anyway. The axioms are
γ,¬γ (Axiom1t)
ca 6= cb if a 6= b (Axiom2t)
t = t (Axiom3t)
t 6= r, r = t (Axiom4t)
t 6= r, r 6= s, t = s (Axiom5t)
t 6= r, S(t) = S(r) (Axiom6t)
t 6= t′, r 6= r′, t+ r = t′ + r′ (Axiom7t)
t 6= t′, r 6= r′, t · r = t′ · r′ (Axiom8t)
S(ca) = cS(a) (Axiom9t)
ca + cb = ca+b (Axiom10t)
ca · cb = ca·b (Axiom11t)
∃v0(t = v0) (Axiom12t)
where γ is an arbitrary LT-sentence, and t, r and s are arbitrary closed LT-terms.
The inference rules are the following:
Γ
Γ, γ
(Weakt)
Γ, γ
Γ, γ ∨ δ
(∨I1t)
Γ, δ
Γ, γ ∨ δ
(∨I2t)
Γ,¬γ Γ,¬δ
Γ,¬(γ ∨ δ)
(∨I3t)
Γ, γ
Γ,¬¬γ
(¬It)
Γ, γ Γ,¬γ
Γ
(Cutt)
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Γ, γ[ca/vi]
Γ, ∃vi γ
(∃It)
. . . Γ,¬γ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
Γ,¬∃vi γ
(M-rulet)
where Γ is an arbitrary finite set of LT-sentences, γ, δ and ∃vi γ are arbitrary
LT-sentences, t and r are arbitrary closed LT-terms and a ∈M.
Similar to M-logic ⊢p
T
∆ means that p is a proof of ∆ in template logic. All
other definitions in M-logic transform almost verbatim to template logic, that is
also the case for Lemma 3.16 and Proposition 3.18.
Please observe that if we are only studying standard formulas template logic
extends M-logic, so any proof in M-logic using only standard formulas and terms
is also a proof in template logic. On the other hand if we restrict template logic
to formulas and terms without template symbols, then M-logic is an extension of
template logic.
3.4.2 Some Technical Results
We need some more information on how the approximating functions work for
later use.
Lemma 3.35. If F is an approximating function and γ is an LT-formula then
F (γ[ca/vi]) = F (γ)[ca/vi].
Proof. Observe first that it is enough to prove the lemma for approximating func-
tions F = Fτ ; the general result follows by “moving” one Fτ at a time.
Since both substitution and approximating functions commute with the sym-
bols ¬, ∨, ∃, =, S, + and · we only have to check the base cases, i.e., when γ is a
constant, variable or template symbol.
If γ is a constant or variable (or even more generally if γ does not contain any
template symbols) we have
Fτ (γ[ca/vi]) = γ[ca/vi] = Fτ (γ)[ca/vi].
If γ is a template symbol, say δ̂, it is clear that if τ ≇ δ then
Fτ (σ̂)[ca/vi] = σ̂[ca/vi] = ̂σ[ca/vi] = Fτ ( ̂σ[ca/vi] = Fτ (σ̂[ca/vi]).
In the third equality we are using the fact that τ ≇ δ[ca/vi], this is easy to see
since if τ ∼= δ[ca/vi] then, since ∼= is a equivalence relation and δ[ca/vi] ∼= δ, τ ∼= δ.
Suppose ψ is ¬γ and ϕ ∼= ψ then
Fϕ(ψ̂)[ca/vi] = ¬γ̂[ca/vi] = ¬ ̂γ[ca/vi] = Fϕ( ̂ψ[ca/vi]) = Fϕ(ψ̂[ca/vi]).
The case when ψ is γ ∨ δ is treated in a similar way. Suppose that ψ is ∃vj γ then
Fϕ(ψ̂)[ca/vi] = (∃vj γ̂)[ca/vi] ={
∃vj ̂γ[ca/vi] = Fϕ( ̂ψ[ca/vi]) = Fϕ(ψ̂[ca/vi]) if i 6= j
∃vj γ̂ = Fϕ(ψ̂) = Fϕ(ψ̂[ca/vi]) otherwise.
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We also have to check the term cases. If the term is a composite term then it is
handled just as the ¬γ case. For the other cases we have
Fvi(v̂i)[ca/vj] = vi[ca/vj ] = {
vi = Fvi(v̂i[ca/vj]) if i 6= j
ca = Fvi(ĉa) = Fvi(v̂i[ca/vj ]) otherwise.
and
Fvj (ĉb)[cb/vi] = cb = Fvj (ĉb[ca/vi]).
Lemma 3.36. If ∆ is a finite set of LT-sentences, F is an approximating function
and ⊢α
T
∆ then ⊢α
T
F (∆).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the proof. It should be clear
that if ∆ is a template axiom then so is F (∆). It is also easy, but tedious, to
check that the inference rules are not affected by F . We will not do it here.
Remark 3.37. It should be clear that the lemma could be strengthen as to say
that if Λ is a set of LT-sentences such that if λ ∈ Λ then F (λ) ∈ Λ for any
approximating function F , ∆ a finite set of LT-sentences, F an approximating
function and Λ ⊢α
T
∆ then Λ ⊢α
T
F (∆).
Lemma 3.38. If F0, F1, . . . are approximating functions such that |Fi| 6 k and
Γ a finite set of ∗LM-sentences then there is an approximating function F such
that
|F | 6
(
2k − 1
)
|Γ|
and
F (Γ) = F (Fi(Γ))
for all i ∈ ω.
Proof. Let
F = Fδn ◦Fδn−1 ◦ . . . ◦Fδ1
where δ1, . . . , δn are all subformulas and subterms occurring in some formula in Γ
at depth 6 k in “the right order,” i.e., if δi is a subformula or subterm of δj then
j < i. Clearly n 6 (2k − 1)|Γ| and F (Γ) = F (Fi(Γ)) for all i.
Definition 3.39. An approximating function
F = Fδn ◦ . . . ◦Fδ1
is said to be in normal form if j < i for every i, j such that δi is a subformula or
subterm of δj .
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Observe that if F is an approximating function and F ′ is Fδk ◦ . . .◦Fδ0 where
Fδ0 , . . . , Fδk are the approximating functions in F ordered such that if δi is a
subformula or subterm of δj then i < j, then F
′ ◦ F (Γ) = F ′(Γ) and F ′ is in
normal form. Therefore if F (Γ) is provable so is F ′(Γ).
From now on we will assume that all approximating functions are in normal
form.
If F1, . . . ,Fk are approximating functions we can form the uniform union
F1 ⋆ . . . ⋆Fk
of them which is any normal form of F1 ◦ . . . ◦Fk. This definition is not unique,
the reader may try to make it unique in a suitable way.
Please observe that if F1 and F2 are approximating functions and ⊢T F (Γ)
then ⊢
T
F1 ⋆F ⋆F2(Γ) since F1 ⋆F ⋆F2(F (Γ)) = F1 ⋆F ⋆F2(Γ).
Lemma 3.40. Let ψ be any ∗LM-sentence and F an approximating function (in
normal form) such that Fψ is in F , then
 if ψ is ¬γ then F (¬γ) = ¬F (γ),
 if ψ is γ1 ∨ γ2 then F (γ1 ∨ γ2) = F (γ1) ∨F (γ2) and
 if ψ is ∃vi γ then F (∃vi γ) = ∃vi F (γ).
Proof. The proof is more or less trivial and left to the reader.
3.4.3 Semantics
We will now start to look at the semantics of template logic and prove a soundness
theorem which implies the consistency of the logic. We end the section by also
proving a completeness theorem.
Definition 3.41. An LT-structure T is a pair 〈Tt,Tv〉 of a set Tt of ∗LM-sentences
and a map Tv from the closed
∗LM-terms into M.
Definition 3.42. If T is an LT-structure define valT(t) for closed LT-terms t
inductively as follows:
valT(r̂) =df Tv(r),
valT(S(r)) =df S(valT(r)),
valT(r + s) =df valT(r) + valT(s) and
valT(r · s) =df valT(r) · valT(s).
Definition 3.43. If T is an LT-structure then define the predicate T  ϕ on
LT-sentences ϕ inductively as follows:
T  t = r iff valT(t) = valT(r),
T  ϕ̂ iff ϕ ∈ Tt,
T  ¬γ iff T 2 γ,
T  γ ∨ δ iff T  γ or T  δ and
T  ∃viγ iff there exists a ∈M such that T  γ[ca/vi].
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We will now prove a soundness property for template logic. Let
∨
∆ be
δ0 ∨ (δ1 ∨ (. . . ∨ δk))
if ∆ = { δ0, . . . , δk } and 0 6= 0 if ∆ = ∅.
Proposition 3.44 (Soundness of template logic). Let ∆ be a finite set of LT-
sentences, let γ be
∨
∆ and Λ any set of LT-sentences. If T is an LT-structure
making all the sentences of Λ true and Λ ⊢
T
∆ then T  γ.
Proof. We have to check that all the axioms of template logic are true in all LT-
structures and that all the inference rules are sound, i.e., if the premises of a
rule are true in some LT-structure then the conclusion is also true in the same
LT-structure. The axioms are quite obvious true and the inference rules are also
easy to check; we only prove that M-rulet is sound. Suppose T  ¬ψ[ca/vi] for all
a ∈ M and T  ∃vi ψ, then there is an a ∈ M such that T  ψ[ca/vi] which is a
contradiction.
Definition 3.45. An LT-sentence γ is said to be true in M if T  γ for all
LT-structures T.
Corollary 3.46. If ⊢
T
Γ then
∨
Γ is true in M.
Now, we easily get the consistency of template logic.
Corollary 3.47. In any model M we have 0
T
0 6= 0.
Proof. Use Corollary 3.46 and the fact that for any template structure T we have
T 2 0 6= 0.
Proposition 3.48 (Completeness of template logic). If ψ is an LT-sentence
true in M then ⊢
T
ψ.
Proof. Suppose 0
T
ψ then { ¬ψ } is a consistent set in template logic and could be
extended to a maximally consistent set Λ in the same way as when we constructed
satisfaction classes from consistent sets in M-logic.
Define the LT-structure T by letting
Tt = { ϕ ϕ is a
∗
LM-sentence and ϕ̂ ∈ Λ }
and
Tv(t) = a iff t̂ = ca ∈ Λ.
We prove that
ϕ ∈ Λ iff T  ϕ
by induction on the construction of ϕ. To handle the case when ϕ is atomic we
first prove that if t is a closed LT-term then t = ca ∈ Λ iff valT(t) = a.
Suppose t is r̂, then the claim is trivially true from the definition of Tv. If t
is S(r) and t = ca ∈ Λ, by Axiom12t, there is a b ∈ M such that r = cb ∈ Λ and
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S
M(b) = a. By the induction hypothesis valT(r) = b so valT(t) = S
M(a) = b.
The case when the term is r + s or r · s is handled in a similar way.
If t = r ∈ Λ then by Axiom12 (and Axiom3, Axiom4 and Axiom5) there is
an a ∈ M such that t = ca ∈ Λ and r = ca ∈ Λ. By the fact proved above
valT(t) = valT(r), so T  t = r.
On the other hand if T  t = r then valT(t) = valT(r) = a for some a ∈ M.
Since, by the maximality of Λ, there are b, d ∈ M such that t = cb ∈ Λ and
r = cd ∈ Λ we have, by the fact proved above, b = d = a. Therefore t = r ∈ Λ.
If ϕ∨ψ ∈ Λ then either ϕ ∈ Λ or ψ ∈ Λ by the maximality of Λ and so, by the
induction hypothesis, either T  ϕ or T  ψ, either way T  ϕ ∨ ψ. On the other
hand, if ϕ ∨ ψ /∈ Λ then neither ϕ nor ψ is in Λ so by the induction hypothesis
T 2 ϕ and T 2 ψ which implies that T 2 ϕ ∨ ψ.
If ¬ϕ ∈ Λ then ϕ /∈ Λ by the consistency of Λ and by the induction hypothesis
T 2 ϕ, therefore T  ¬ϕ. If ¬ϕ /∈ Λ then ϕ ∈ Λ so T  ϕ and T 2 ¬ϕ.
If ∃vi ϕ ∈ Λ then there exists a ∈M such that ϕ[ca/vi] ∈ Λ and so T  ϕ[ca/vi]
and T  ∃vi ϕ. And if ∃vi ϕ /∈ Λ then ϕ[ca/vi] /∈ Λ for all a ∈M. By the induction
hypothesis T 2 ϕ[ca/vi] for all a ∈M so T 2 ∃vi ϕ.
To sum up this section, the main result is that for an LT-sentence γ we have
that γ is true in M iff ⊢
T
γ.
3.4.4 A link between M-logic and template logic
In this section we prove that finite provability in M-logic implies provability of
some approximation in template logic. Since template logic is consistent (Theo-
rem 3.44) this will imply that M-logic is consistent.
Proposition 3.49. There is a (recursive) function G : ω → ω such that if ⊢n
M
Γ
then there is an approximating function F such that |F | 6 G(n) and ⊢
T
F (Γ).
Proof. If n = 1 then Γ is an axiom. It is easy to see that an approximating function
of length 9 is enough to make F (Γ) into an axiom of template logic.
Suppose we have defined G for all values 6 n and take a proof of height n+1, by
the induction hypothesis we get a proof of some approximation of the premises of
the last inference of the proof, with the approximating functions of length 6 G(n).
Suppose the last inference is
Weak:
Λ
Λ, ϕ
By the induction hypothesis we have an approximating function F such that
⊢
T
F (Λ), by Weakt we get a proof of F (Λ),F (ϕ) which is the same as F (Λ, ϕ),
therefore G(n+ 1) = G(n) is enough for this case.
∨I1 (and ∨I2):
Λ, ϕ
Λ, ϕ ∨ ψ
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By the induction hypothesis we get an approximating function F0 such that
⊢
T
F0(Λ, ϕ).
Let F = F0 ⋆Fϕ∨ψ then F (Λ, ϕ) is provable and by ∨I1t
F (Λ),F (ϕ) ∨F (ψ) = F (Λ, ϕ ∨ ψ)
is provable. Therefore G(n+ 1) = G(n) + 1 is enough for this case.
∨I3:
Λ,¬ϕ Λ,¬ψ
Λ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
By the induction hypothesis we get approximating functions F0 and F1 such that
F0(Λ,¬ϕ) and F1(Λ,¬ψ) are both provable. Let
F = F0 ⋆F1 ⋆Fϕ∨ψ ⋆F¬(ϕ∨ψ) ⋆F¬ϕ ⋆F¬ψ ,
by Lemma 3.36 F (Λ,¬ϕ) and F (Λ,¬ψ) are both provable. Since
F (Λ,¬ϕ) = F (Λ),¬F (ϕ) and F (Λ,¬ψ) = F (Λ),¬F (ψ)
we have by ∨I3t a proof of
F (Λ),¬(F (ϕ) ∨F (ψ)) = F (Λ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)).
Therefore G(n+ 1) = 2G(n) + 4 is enough for this case.
¬I:
Λ, ϕ
Λ,¬¬ϕ
By the induction hypothesis we get an approximating function F0 such that
F0(Λ, ϕ)
is provable. Let
F = F0 ⋆F¬ϕ ⋆F¬¬ϕ,
then
F (Λ, ϕ) = F (Λ),F (ϕ)
is provable, so ¬It gives us a proof of
F (Λ),¬¬F (ϕ) = F (Λ),F (¬¬ϕ) = F (Λ, ϕ).
Thus G(n+ 1) = G(n) + 2 is enough for this case.
Cut:
Γ, ϕ Γ,¬ϕ
Γ
By the induction hypothesis we get approximating functions F0 and F1 such that
F0(Λ, ϕ) and F1(Λ,¬ϕ) are provable. Let
F = F0 ⋆F1 ⋆F¬ϕ,
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then
F (Γ, ϕ) = F (Γ),F (ϕ) and
F (Γ,¬ϕ) = F (Γ),¬F (ϕ)
are both provable. By Cutt we get a proof of F (Γ). Thus G(n + 1) = 2G(n) + 1
is enough for this case.
∃I:
Λ, ϕ[ca/vi]
Λ, ∃vi ϕ
By the induction hypothesis we get an approximating function F0 such that
F0(Λ, ϕ[ca/vi])
is provable. Let
F = F0 ⋆F∃vi ϕ
then
F (Λ, ϕ[ca/vi]) = F (Λ),F (ϕ)[ca/vi]
is provable (the equality is Lemma 3.35) so by ∃It we get a proof of
F (Λ), ∃vi F (ϕ) = F (Λ),F (∃vi ϕ) = F (Λ, ∃vi ϕ).
Thus G(n+ 1) = G(n) + 1 is enough for this case.
M-rule:
. . . Λ,¬ϕ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
Λ,¬∃vi ϕ
By the induction hypothesis we have approximating functions Fa such that
Fa(Λ,¬ϕ[ca/vi]) = Fa(Λ),Fa(¬ϕ)[ca/vi]
are provable for all a ∈M. Let F ′ be as in Lemma 3.38 and
F = F ′ ⋆F∃vi ϕ ⋆F¬∃vi ϕ,
then
F (Λ),F (¬ϕ)[ca/vi] = F (Λ),¬F (ϕ)[ca/vi]
are all provable by Lemma 3.36. By M-rulet we get a proof of
F (Λ),¬∃vi F (ϕ) = F (Λ),F (¬∃vi ϕ) = F (Λ,¬∃vi ϕ).
Thus G(n + 1) = (n + 2)(2G(n) − 1) + 2 is enough since if ⊢n
M
Γ then |Γ| 6 n + 2
and therefore |F ′| 6 (n+ 2)(2G(n) − 1) by Lemma 3.36.
Thus, if we define G recursively by
G(1) = 9
G(n+ 1) = (n+ 2)(2G(n) − 1) + 2 for n > 1,
then G satisfies the proposition.
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Definition 3.50. If Λ is a set of ∗LM-sentences then app(Λ) is a set of LT-
sentences defined as
app(Λ) = {F (λ) λ ∈ Λ and F is an approximating function } .
Porism 3.51. If Λ is a set of ∗LM-sentences and Λ ⊢
ω
M
Γ then app(Λ) ⊢
T
F (Γ) for
some approximating function F .
In fact we could strengthen the porism: Let ∆ be any set of LT-sentences closed
under approximating functions, i.e., if ψ ∈ ∆ and F is an approximating function
then F (ψ) ∈ ∆. Let Λ be a set of ∗LM-sentences and k a natural numbers such
that for every ϕ ∈ Λ there exists an approximating function F such that |F | 6 k
and F (ϕ) ∈ ∆. If Λ ⊢ω
M
Γ then there exists F such that ∆ ⊢
T
F (Γ).
3.4.5 The consistency of M-logic
Proposition 3.52. If M is recursively saturated and ⊢
M
Γ then there is an ap-
proximating function F such that ⊢
T
F (Γ).
Proof. Combine Propositions 3.27 and 3.49.
Proposition 3.53. Suppose M is recursively saturated, Λ is a definable set and
there is a template structure T such that
T  λ, for all λ ∈ app(Λ)
then Λ is consistent in M-logic.
Proof. By Proposition 3.27 if Λ ⊢
M
∅ then Λ ⊢ω
M
∅. By Porism 3.51 there is a proof
in template logic of ∅ from the set app(Λ), i.e., app(Λ) ⊢
T
∅. By Proposition 3.44
we then have T  0 6= 0 which clearly is a contradiction.
Corollary 3.54. If M is recursively saturated then M-logic is consistent, i.e.,
0
M
∅.
In fact, we can prove something a bit stronger by carefully examine the proofs
of Proposition 3.27, 3.49 and 3.44:
Theorem 3.55. Let Λ be a set of ∗LM-sentences such that the expanded structure
〈M,Λ〉 is recursively saturated, let ∆ be a set of LT-sentences closed under ap-
proximating functions and n a natural number such that if ϕ ∈ Λ then there exists
an approximating function F such that |F | 6 n and F (ϕ) ∈ ∆. Moreover let
∆k = {F (ϕ) |F | 6 k ∧ ϕ ∈ Λ ∧F (ϕ) ∈ ∆ } .
If there exists template structures Tk such that
Tk  δ for all δ ∈ ∆k
then Λ is consistent in M-logic.
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The next result is a, sort of, negative result. Usually it is expressed as M-logic
admits full pathology.
Let δ0 be 0 6= 0 and by induction define δa+1 to be δa ∨ δa for all a ∈M.
Proposition 3.56. If M is recursively saturated and countable and a ∈ M \ ω
then M admits a satisfaction class Σ such that δa ∈ Σ.
Proof. The approximations of δa are
δ̂a,
δ̂a−1 ∨ δ̂a−1,
(δ̂a−2 ∨ δ̂a−2) ∨ (δ̂a−2 ∨ δ̂a−2),
and so on. The template structure T = 〈Tv,Tt〉 with Tv(t) = 0 for all closed
terms t and Tt = { δa−k : k ∈ ω } makes all these approximations true. Applying
Proposition 3.53 gives us the proposition.
Proposition 3.57. If t is a term with no constants or multiplications at finite
depth, e.g.,
S(S(. . . S(0) . . .))
with a nonstandard number of successor symbols, and a ∈M \ ω then there exists
a satisfaction class Σ such that t = ca ∈ Σ.
Proof. We have to prove that there is a template structure making all the approx-
imations of t = ca true. Define Tv(t) = a and by induction define Tv on all closed
terms occurring in t at constant depth. If Tv(r) = b and r is S(s) then define
Tv(s) = b− 1 and if r is s+ s′ let
Tv(s) = Tv(s
′) = b/2
if b is even and
Tv(s) =
b+ 1
2
, Tv(s
′) =
b− 1
2
if b is odd. Let Tv(ca) = a and for all closed terms r not occurring in t at finite
depth let Tv(r) = 0. Finally, let Tt = { t = ca }.
It should now be clear that valT(F (t)) = a, and so T  F (t = ca) for any
approximating function F . Applying Proposition 3.53 gives us the result.
The proposition is false if we allow multiplication at finite depth in t, since if
t is, for example,
S(S(r)) · S(S(s))
and a ∈M is prime, i.e.,
M  S(0) < a ∧ ∀x, y
(
x · y = a→ x = S(0) ∨ y = S(0)
)
,
then ⊢
M
t 6= ca.
The next result is a partial answer to Question 3.7.
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Proposition 3.58. Let ∼ be an LM-definable equivalence relation on ClTerm(M)
and
E = { t = r t ∼ r } .
If ME is well-defined and the canonical map
f : M→ME , a 7→ ca
is an isomorphism then there is a satisfaction class Σ such that
t ∼ r iff t = r ∈ Σ
for all closed ∗LM-terms t and r.
Proof. We prove that the LM-definable set E is consistent in M-logic. We do
this by defining a template structure T = 〈Tt,Tv〉 such that all LT-sentences in
app(E) are true in T.
Let
Tv(t) = f
−1( t )
and Tt = E. We claim that
T  F (t = r)
for closed ∗LM-terms t and r such that t ∼ r and any approximating function F .
To see this we first observe that for any closed ∗LM-term t and any approximating
function F we have
T  t̂ = F (t).
This is proved by induction on |F |. For |F | = 0 it is trivial and for the induction
step all we have to do is to observe that
valT(S( t̂ )) = S
M(valT( t̂ )) = S
M(f−1( t )) = f−1(SME ( t )) =
f−1(S(t)) = valT(Ŝ(t))
and similar for + and ·. This means that when we substitute, for example, S( t̂ )
for Ŝ(t) the value of valT does not change. Therefore
valT(F (t)) = valT( t̂ )
for any closed ∗LM-term t and any approximating function F . This proves the
claim.
3.4.6 Some auxiliary results
We will end this chapter by proving converse results of Proposition 3.53 and 3.49.
Proposition 3.59. If Λ is a consistent set in M-logic of ∗LM-sentences then there
is a template structure T making all sentences λ ∈ app(Λ) true.
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Proof. Since Λ is consistent it is contained in some satisfaction class Σ. Define T
to interpret the approximation symbols exactly as Σ sees them, i.e., define
Tt = Σ
and
Tv( t̂ ) = a iff t = ca ∈ Σ
It is clear that T  ϕ̂ if ϕ ∈ Λ, therefore, all we have to prove is that
T  ψ ⇒ T  Fτ (ψ),
for any LT-sentences ψ and any template symbols τ .
If τ is ¬̂ϕ then by observing that
T  ¬̂ϕ iff T  ¬ϕ̂
we see that replacing all occurrences of ¬̂ϕ by ¬ϕ̂ does not change the truth value
of the sentence. In the same way we have
T  ϕ̂ ∨ ψ iff T  ϕ̂ ∨ ψ̂ and
T  ∃̂viϕ iff T  ∃viϕ̂.
Therefore, substituting ϕ̂ ∨ ψ̂ for ϕ̂ ∨ ψ in a sentence does not change the truth
value. The same holds for ∃viϕ̂ and ∃̂viϕ.
We also have that if τ is Ŝ(t) then
T  Ŝ(t) = S( t̂ )
so substituting S( t̂ ) for Ŝ(t)does not change the truth value either. The same is
true for addition and multiplication since
T  t̂+ r = t̂+ r̂ and
T  t̂ · r = t̂ · r̂.
We have to check two more cases, the following observations will handle those:
T  t̂ = r iff T  t̂ = r̂ and
T  ĉa = ca.
We are now in a good position to prove a converse to Proposition 3.49.
Proposition 3.60. If Γ is a finite set of ∗LM-sentences, F is any approximating
function and ⊢
T
F (Γ) then ⊢
M
Γ.
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Proof. Suppose that 0
M
Γ, then ¬Γ is consistent in M-logic. By Proposition 3.59
there is a template structure T satisfying app(¬Γ), but if ⊢
T
F (Γ) then
T 
∨
F (Γ),
by Proposition 3.44. Clearly, then there is a γ ∈ Γ such that
T  F (γ),
therefore, T 2 ¬F (γ) and so
T 2 F ⋆F¬γ(¬γ).
Since
F ⋆F¬γ(¬γ) ∈ app(¬Γ)
this yields a contradiction.
To sum up we illustrate the chapter by Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: A diagram showing the main results of Chapter 3.
4Weaker satisfaction classes
In this chapter we will study sets which fail to be satisfaction classes, but just
merely; Axiom12 might be false in it, i.e., there might be terms t such that
¬∃v0(t = v0)
is in the set.
4.1 Free M-logic
We will try to answer the question:
What happens if we remove Axiom12 from the axioms of M-logic?
Let us call a set of ∗LM-sentences satisfying the alternative definition of satisfac-
tion class given in Proposition 3.6 but with the word ‘isomorphism’ changed to
‘isomorphic embedding’ for a free satisfaction class. AndM-logic without Axiom12
for free M-logic.1
Proposition 4.1. Free M-logic corresponds to free satisfaction classes in the same
way as M-logic corresponds to satisfaction classes, i.e., every maximally consis-
tent set of sentences in free M-logic is a free satisfaction class and every free
satisfaction class is a maximally consistent set of sentences.
Proof. Assume X is a maximally consistent set in free M-logic. We have to prove
that X satisfies the definition of a free satisfaction class, the only nontrivial parts
are to prove that ∼X is an equivalence relation, that MX is well-defined and that
the canonical map f : M→MX is an isomorphic embedding.
Clearly, Axiom3, Axiom4 and Axiom5 implies that ∼X is an equivalence rela-
tion, furthermore Axiom6, Axiom7 and Axiom8 implies that MX is well-defined.
That f is a homomorphism follows from Axiom9, Axiom10 and Axiom11. Finally,
the injectivity follows from Axiom2.
1See Remark 4.5 for an explanation of the name.
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For the converse, assume that Σ is a free satisfaction class. Σ is clearly max-
imally consistent if it is consistent since for every ∗LM-sentence ϕ either ϕ ∈ Σ
or ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. Thus, all we have to prove is that Σ is consistent in free M-logic,
i.e., we have to check that if ∆ is an axiom then
∨
∆ ∈ Σ and that Σ is closed
under all inference rules; the consistency then follows from the fact that there are
∗LM-sentences not in Σ.
From the fact that ∼Σ is an equivalence relation it is easy to see that the
disjunctions of Axiom3, Axiom4 and Axiom5 all are in Σ. For Axiom6; assume
that t = r ∈ Σ, by the well-definition of MΣ
S(t) = SMΣ( t ) = SMΣ(r) = S(r),
thus, S(t) = S(r) ∈ Σ. Similar for Axiom7 and Axiom8. Clearly, the disjunction
of Axiom1 is in Σ, and if a 6= b then
ca = f(a) 6= f(b) = cb
so ca = cb /∈ Σ. Therefore, by the maximality of Σ we have ca 6= cb ∈ Σ.
Furthermore,
ca+Mb = f(a+
M b) = f(a) +MΣ f(b) = ca +
MΣ cb = ca + cb.
Thus ca+Mb = ca + cb ∈ Σ and similarly for Axiom9 and Axiom11.
That Σ is closed under the inference rules is proved by using properties (3.10),
(3.11) and (3.12) of Σ, it is left to the reader.
A natural question now arises:
Are there free satisfaction classes which are not satisfaction classes?
The answer is yes as we now will prove. We prove that if a ∈ M \ ω then we can
find a free satisfaction class Σ such that ¬∃v0(na = v0) ∈ Σ, where na is the closed
term defined inductively as follows:
na =
{
0 if a = 0
S(nb) if a = S
M(b).
The consistency criteria we worked out in Chapter 3 is too acute to handle this
since in every LT-structure T we have
T  ∃v0(F (na) = v0)
for any approximating function F . The solution to this problem is to redefine and
make LT-structures more general.
Definition 4.2. A free LT-structure, T, is a pair, 〈Tt,Tv〉, of a set, Tt, of ∗LM-
sentences and a map, Tv, from the closed
∗LM-terms into some LA-structure
N ⊇M.
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Truth in a free LT-structure is defined in the obvious way.
We state the consistency criteria in one of its simplest forms, but it should be
evident that it could be strengthen as in Theorem 3.55.
Proposition 4.3. Let ϕ be a ∗LM-sentence and F0 an approximating function
such that there exists a free LT-structure making F ◦F0(ϕ) true for any approx-
imating function F . Then ¬ϕ cannot be proved in free M-logic.
Proof. Only some small modifications to the proofs of Proposition 3.44 and 3.49
is needed. The details are left to the reader.
Let N !M and b ∈ N \M. Define
Tv(na−k) =df b− k for all k ∈ ω,
Tt =df ∅,
T =df 〈Tt,Tv〉 and
F0 =df Fv0 ◦Fna=v0 ◦F∃v0(na=v0) ◦F¬∃v0(na=v0).
Clearly
T  F ◦F0(¬∃v0(na = v0))
for every approximating function F , since valT(F (na)) = b for every F . There-
fore, by the proposition, ¬∃v0(na = v0) is consistent in free M-logic. By the usual
construction we can find a maximally consistent set Σ including ¬∃v0(na = v0)
which by Proposition 4.1 is a free satisfaction class. Σ is not a satisfaction class
since Axiom12 is not true.
Remark 4.4. Even though a free satisfaction class Σ is a satisfaction class if for
every closed ∗LM-term t there exists a ∈ M such that t = ca ∈ Σ and we get an
equivalent definition of satisfaction class if we replace (3.9) in Definition 3.2 by
∃x t = cx ∈ Σ
for every closed ∗LM-term t, we do not get an equivalent definition of a free
satisfaction class by removing (3.9) in that definition. This is a consequence of the
fact that the ∗LM-sentence
S(ca) = S(nb) ∧ ca 6= nb (4.1)
is consistent in free M-logic for any a, b ∈ M such that b > ω, and therefore
included in some free satisfaction class. But (3.6) implies that for any satisfaction
class Σ in which 3.9 may fail the sentence (4.1) is false since if S(ca) = S(nb) ∈ Σ
then cSM(a) = S(nb) ∈ Σ, thus (3.6) implies that ca = nb ∈ Σ. To prove that
the sentence (4.1) is consistent in free M-logic it is enough to construct an LA-
structure N ! M such that for some d ∈ N we have SN(d) = SM(a) and d 6= a.
Then define an LT-structure mapping nb−k to d− k for every k ∈ ω.
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Remark 4.5. We are using the term free since freeM-logic is a sort of (positive) free
logic, see [Lam01]. In fact the part of freeM-logic where we only consider sentences
of the form σ[t1, . . . , tk/vi1 , . . . , vik ], where σ is a LM-formula and t1, . . . , tk are
closed ∗LM-terms, is a (positive) free logic, with the existential predicate defined
as
E! t↔def ∃v0(t = v0).
In fact, for any ϕ(x) of this form and any closed ∗LM-terms t and r we can prove
(in this restricted free M-logic)
ϕ(t) ∧ t = r → ϕ(r).
Therefore, it is easy to see that
ϕ(t) ∧ E! t→ ∃xϕ(x)
also is provable (in the same logic). See [Lam01] or [Ben99] for more information
on free logics.
Question 4.6. Which LA-structures N ⊇ M are MΣ for some free satisfaction
class Σ?
Question 4.7. Are there free satisfaction classes Σ, which are not satisfaction
classes, such that the canonical map f : M→MΣ is an elementary embedding?
5Stronger satisfaction classes
As we have seen in Chapter 3 some “pathological” examples arise in the study of
satisfaction classes. For example, we can make the sentences δa and na = cb true
in a satisfaction class (if a, b are nonstandard).1 The main question we will try to
answer in this chapter is:
What do we need to remove such “pathological” examples?
To answer this question we have concentrated on extensions of M-logic. Any
maximally consistent set of sentences in any of the extensions we will study in this
chapter is a satisfaction class removing pathologies of a certain kind.
It should be remarked that this chapter is included to emphasise the vast
amount of open questions in this area. There is a lot of work to be done, I have
just scratched the surface. The big question of consistency of the extensions is a
hard question. We know the answer to some of them but not to all, but a small
remark is in order here:
Remark 5.1. Since every logic we will study have axioms and inference rules de-
finable in PA, consistency is a Σ11 statement:
∃X∃ϕ
(
Sent(ϕ) ∧ ϕ /∈ X ∧X includes all axioms
∧X is closed under all inference rules
)
.
Therefore, in countable models, consistency of one of these extensions of M-logic
could only depend on Th(M) and not on other model theoretic properties of M,
such as saturation properties, since if M-logic is consistent then M is recursively
saturated by Theorem 3.29 and so resplendent by Theorem 2.7.
Figure 5.1 is a summary of some of the pathologies and their “solutions.” The
sentences ǫϕa are defined as follows:
ǫϕ0 is ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) and
ǫϕa+1 is ǫa ∨ ǫa.
1Remember that δ0 is 0 6= 0, δa+1 is δa ∨ δa, n0 is 0 and nSM(a) is S(na).
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Pathology Solution Consistent? Section
na = cb Axioms: TrAt Yes 5.1
δa Axioms: Tr∆0 Yes 5.1
ǫϕa Rule: Prop ? 5.2
∃v0v1 . . . va 0 6= 0 Axioms: TrΣ1 Yes 5.1
Rules: I∃∞, M∞-rule ? 5.3(
∃v0v1 . . . va ϕ
)
↔ ¬ϕ
Rule: Pred ? 5.5
Rule: Skolem-rule ? 5.4(
∃v0∀v1 . . . ∃v2a ϕ
)
↔ ¬ϕ
Rule: Pred ? 5.5
Figure 5.1: A summary of the pathological examples we will study in this chapter
and their “solutions.”
In the table, a is nonstandard and ϕ is a sentence of high complexity (it is not
Σk for any k ∈ ω). The ‘Solution’ to a pathology tells us what we need to add to
M-logic (either axioms of inference rules) to remove the pathology, i.e., to be able
to prove the negation of the pathology. The ‘Consistent?’ column tells us if this
logic is consistent or not; a ‘Yes’ means that in any recursively saturated model
the logic is consistent and a ‘?’ means that we do not know the answer. The
column named ‘Section’ is a reference for where to read more about the solution,
it is the section number in this chapter.
Question 5.2. How should Figure 5.1 be completed?
5.1 Partial Truth Definitions
In [Kay91] a satisfaction class is defined to extend the set
TrAt = { t = r M  val(t) = val(r) } .
By Proposition 3.53 this set is consistent since we can define a template structure
T = 〈Tt,Tv〉, with
Tt = { t = r M  val(t) = val(r) } and
Tv = val,
where val is the valuation function definable in PA. This is a template structure
making all LT-sentences in app(TrAt) true. In the same manner we can find
template structures making all sentences in app(TrΣk) true.
Proposition 5.3. The sets TrAt, Tr∆k , TrΣk and TrΠk are all consistent.
Proof. It is clearly enough to prove that TrΣk is consistent for any k ∈ ω. The
sets are definable so, by Proposition 3.53, it suffices to find a template structure
making the LT-sentences in app(TrΣk) true.
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Let T = 〈Tv,Tt〉 be such that Tv(t) = a iff M  val(t) = ca and let Tt = TrΣk .
By an easy induction it is easy to see that this structure satisfies the condition.
The induction is left to the reader, but we remark that the properties of val and
TrΣk in Section 2.4 are used heavily.
5.2 Closure under propositional logic
Satisfaction classes closed under nonstandard propositional proofs, in the sense
that if M thinks ϕ is provable in propositional logic from sentences in Σ then
ϕ ∈ Σ, is the next object of study. Firstly, we have to define what it means for
a model to think something is provable in propositional logic, i.e., we need some
formula expressing propositional provability.
Definition 5.4. If σ(x) is any formula then PropPrfσ(y) is defined to be the
formula
∃x
(
[x]len(x)−1 = y ∧ ∀i< len(x)
[
Sent([x]i) ∧
[
Ax([x]i) ∨ σ([x]i)
∨ ∃j, k<i∃z
(
[x]j = z → [x]i ∧ [x]k = z
)]])
,
where Ax(x) is a formula defining the axioms of propositional logic.2
The formula PropPrfσ(y) says that there exists a sequence of sentences such
that every element in the sequence is a ∗LM-sentence ϕ and either an axiom,
satisfying σ, or a result of applying Modus Ponens to other sentences occurring in
the sequence prior to ϕ.
This section is about satisfaction classes closed under this relation, in the sense
that
M  ∀x
(
PropPrfx∈Σ(x)→ x ∈ Σ
)
.
For simplicity we will write Λ ⊢∗p ϕ to mean M  PropPrfx∈Λ(ϕ), but please do
remember that all propositional proofs are “inside” the model M.
It is important to observe that we have a sort of compactness theorem even for
nonstandard proofs:
Proposition 5.5. Let M+ be any expansion of M, σ(x) a formula in the language
of M+ and σ ⊢∗p ϕ, then there exists an LM-formula δ(x) such that
M
+  ∀x
(
δ(x)→ σ(x)
)
∧ ∃x∀y
(
δ(y)→ y < x
)
∧ PropPrfδ(ϕ).
Proof. Let p be a proof of ϕ from σ, i.e., a witness for the existential sentence
PropPrfσ(ϕ). Define δ(x) to be
∃i< len(p)
(
[p]i = x ∧ ¬ Ax(x) ∧ ∀j, k< len(p)∀y
(
[p]j = y → x → [p]k 6= y
))
,
saying that x is a sentence in the proof p but it is not a result of Modus Ponens,
neither an axiom of propositional logic. Clearly, this LM-formula has the desired
property.
2The axioms could be chosen in a variety of ways. Use your favourite axiomatisation.
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Define
∨
Γ, for any finite set of ∗LM-sentences Γ, in the following way: let
∨
Γ
be the ∗LM-sentence
γ0 ∨
(
γ2 ∨
(
γ3 ∨
(
. . . γk−1
)))
where γi < γi+1 for all i < k − 1 and γ0, . . . , γk−1 enumerates the set Γ.
We will define a new logic, extending M-logic, that corresponds to satisfaction
classes closed under propositional proofs. We call it Mp-logic and it is similar to
M-logic, with the important difference that Weak, ∨I1, ∨I2, ∨I3, ¬I and Cut are
replaced by the single rule:
. . . Λ, ϕi . . . i<a
Γ
if
{∨
Λ ∨ ϕ0, . . . ,
∨
Λ ∨ ϕa−1
}
⊢∗p
∨
Γ, (Prop)
where a ∈M and ϕi, for i < a, are
∗LM-sentences.
This means that the inference rules ofMp-logic are Prop, ∃I andM-rule. Please
observe that we still restrict the sets of ∗LM-sentences we derive to be actually
finite.
It is easy to see that Weak, ∨I1, ∨I2, ∨I3, ¬I and Cut are all derivable from
the single rule Prop, therefore, Mp-logic is an extension of M-logic.
Let ⊢
Mp
denote provability in Mp-logic and let ⊢αMpmean provability with a proof
of height less than α, analogous to the ⊢
M
and ⊢α
M
relations.
We will show that Mp-logic is actually “finite” in the sense that if something
is provable then it is provable by a finite height proof (as M-logic also is). This
will be true for all logics studied in this chapter, but since all proofs follow the
same line, we will only prove it for Mp-logic.
We define formulas Pf′k(x) as follows. Let Pf
′
1(x) be the formula defining the
axioms of Mp-logic, i.e., M  Pf
′
1(a) iff a is
∨
Γ for Γ an axiom of Mp-logic.
Furthermore, let
Pf′k+1(x) = PropPrfPf′
k
(x)
∨ ∃y, z, i
(
Sent(y) ∧ Sent( ∃vi z ) ∧ x = ∃vi z ∨ y
∧ ∃y Pf′k( z[cy/vi] ∨ y )
)
∨ ∃y, z, i
(
Sent(y) ∧ Sent( ∃vi z ) ∧ x = ¬∃vi z ∨ y
∧ ∀y Pf′k( ¬z[cy/vi] ∨ y )
)
,
for k > 1.
These formulas “code” proofs of finite height in Mp-logic in the following way:
Lemma 5.6. If Γ is a finite set of ∗LM-sentences, ϕ is
∨
Γ and k > 0, then
⊢kMpΓ =⇒ M  Pf
′
k(ϕ) and
M  Pf′k(ϕ) =⇒ ⊢
3k−2
Mp
ϕ.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For the base case, assume that ⊢1
Mp
Γ then
Γ is an axiom of Mp-logic and M  Pf
′
1(ϕ). On the other hand, if M  Pf
′
1(ϕ)
then, let Λ be the axiom such that
∨
Λ is ϕ, since∨
Λ ⊢∗p ϕ,
we have ⊢2
Mp
ϕ.
For the induction step assume that the lemma holds for k 6 n. We will only
prove the Prop cases, the ∃I and the M-rule cases are left to the reader.
Assume that ⊢n+1
Mp
Γ and that the last inference in the proof of Γ is Prop, then
there is a finite set Λ and ∗LM-sentences ϕ0, . . . , ϕa−1 such that{∨
Λ ∨ ϕ0, . . . ,
∨
Λ ∨ ϕa−1
}
⊢∗p
∨
Γ,
and ⊢n
Mp
Λ, ϕi for all i < a. By the induction hypothesis,
M  Pf′n(
∨
Λ, ϕi),
so, clearly,
Pf′n ⊢
∗
p
∨
Λ ∨ ϕi,
for all i < a. Thus, Pf′n ⊢
∗
p ϕ, and so M  Pf
′
n+1(ϕ).
On the other hand, if M  Pf′n+1(ϕ) and
M  Pf′n ⊢
∗
p ϕ,
then there exists, by Proposition 5.5, ∗LM-sentences ϕ0, . . . , ϕb−1 such that
M  Pf′n(ϕi)
for all i < b and
{ ϕi }i<b ⊢
∗
p ϕ.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
⊢3n−2
Mp
ϕi
for all i < b, and so, by using Prop,
⊢3n−1
Mp
ϕ.
The lemma tells us that
⊢ωMpΓ iff there exists k ∈ ω such that M  Pf
′
k(
∨
Γ),
for any finite set Γ of ∗LM-sentences.
Lemma 5.7. If M is recursively saturated and ⊢
Mp
Γ then ⊢ω
Mp
Γ.
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Proof. Assume the lemma is false and let Γ be such that
⊢ω+1
Mp
Γ but 0ωMp Γ,
we can find such Γ as in Lemma 3.27. Either the last rule in the proof of height ω
of Γ is M-rule or Prop. For the first case the last inference is
. . . ∆,¬ψ[ca/vi] . . . a∈M
∆,¬∃vi ψ .
Define the type
p(x) =
{
¬ Pf′k( ¬ψ[cx/vi] ∨ ϕ ) k ∈ ω
}
,
where ϕ is
∨
∆.
For the second case the last inference is
. . . Λ, ϕi . . . i<a
Γ
,
where
{ ψ ∨ ϕ0, . . . , ψ ∨ ϕa−1 } ⊢
∗
p ϕ,
ψ is
∨
Λ, ϕ is
∨
Γ and a is nonstandard. By Proposition 5.5 there is a LM-
definable subset ∆ of { ψ ∨ ϕi }i<a such that
∆ ⊢∗p ϕ
Let b ∈M enumerate ∆ such that
{ [b]i i < len b } = ∆
and define the type
p(x) =
{
¬ Pf′k( ψ ∨ (b)x ) k ∈ ω
}
∪ { x < len b } .
In either case p(x) is a non-realized recursive type contradicting the recursive
saturation of M.
The Lemma tells us that to prove the consistency of Mp-logic we only need to
prove that
∀k∈ωM  ¬ Pf′k( 0 6= 0 ).
We have, however, not succeeding in doing so.3
3In a preliminary draft of this thesis a proof of the consistency was presented, but it turned
out to be erroneous.
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Remark 5.8. It is easy to see that there are modelsM whereMp-logic is consistent.
Let N be the standard model of PA and let Σ0 be the standard satisfaction class
on N, i.e.,
Σ0 = { ϕ ϕ ∈ ElDiag(N) } .
Clearly, Σ0 is closed under propositional proofs; thus,
〈N,Σ0〉  SatCl(Σ0) ∧ ∀x
(
PropPrfx∈Σ0(x)→ x ∈ Σ0
)
.
Therefore, if
〈N,Σ0〉 ≺ 〈M,Σ〉
then Σ is a satisfaction class closed under propositional proofs.
Let us now instead prove that Mp-logic corresponds to satisfaction classes
closed under propositional proofs.
Proposition 5.9. Satisfaction classes closed under propositional proofs are ex-
actly the maximally consistent sets in Mp-logic.
Proof. Let Σ be a maximally consistent set. It is easy to see that it is a satisfaction
class, just as we did in Chapter 3. We check that it is closed under propositional
logic. Suppose Σ ⊢∗p ϕ, then by the maximality either ϕ or ¬ϕ is in Σ. If ¬ϕ ∈ Σ
then Σ ⊢
Mp
∅, therefore, since Σ is consistent, ϕ ∈ Σ.
If Σ is a satisfaction class closed under propositional proofs then it is consistent
inMp-logic, since it is closed under Prop, ∃I andM-rule. It is maximally consistent
since for every ϕ either ϕ ∈ Σ or ¬ϕ ∈ Σ.
5.3 Infinite ∃I and M-rule
The inference rule Prop handles the propositional connectives in a satisfying way.
In a first try to handle quantifiers we add two infinite versions of ∃I and M-rule:
Γ, ϕ[c(a)0 , c(a)1 , . . . , c(a)b/vi0 , vi1 , . . . , vib ]
Γ, ∃vi0 , vi1 , . . . , vib ϕ
(I∃∞)
and
. . . Γ,¬ϕ[c(a)0 , c(a)1 , . . . , c(a)b/vi0 , vi1 , . . . , vib ] . . . a∈M
Γ,¬∃vi0 , . . . , vib ϕ
(M∞-rule)
where b ∈M may be nonstandard.
Definition 5.10 ([Kra76]). A satisfaction class Σ is ∃-complete if
∃vi0 , . . . , vib ϕ ∈ Σ iff there exists a ∈M such that
ϕ[c(a)0 , . . . , c(a)b/vi0 , . . . , vib ] ∈ Σ.
The following proposition should now be easy to prove.
Proposition 5.11. A set of ∗LM-sentences is a maximally consistent set in M-
logic with I∃∞ and M∞-rule added iff it is a ∃-complete satisfaction class.
Proof. Left to the reader.
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5.4 Skolem operators
It seems that we could extend the infinite quantifier rules even more. To be able
to state this extended quantifier rule we need the notion of Skolem operators.
Let Q be a ∗LM-definable sequence of quantifiers, i.e., Q ∈M such that
∀j< len(Q)∃i
(
[Q]j = ∃vi ∨ [Q]j = ∀vi
)
.
Define a function fQ : M 7→M such that the fQ(j)th ∀-quantifier in Q is the first
∀-quantifier preceding (to the left of) the jth ∃-quantifier in Q. More formally;
there is a PA-definable function F (x, y) such that the following is provable in PA:
F (x, y) = 0 if x is not a sequence of quantifiers.
F ([], y) = 0
F (x, 0) = 0
F ([ ∃vi ]⌢x, S(y)) = F (x, y)
F ([ ∀vi ]⌢x, y) = S(F (x, y)) if y 6= 0
Define fQ(x) = F (Q, x) and let Q∃ be the number of ∃-quantifiers in Q, i.e.,
Q∃ = H(Q) where
H([]) = 0,
H([ ∃vi ]⌢x) = S(H(x)) and
H([ ∀vi ]⌢x) = H(x).
Definition 5.12. A function Ψ : M 7→ M is a Skolem operator for the sequence
of quantifiers Q if
∀x, y∀j<Q∃
(
∀i<fQ(S(j))
[
(x)i = (y)i
]
→ (Ψ(x))j = (Ψ(y))j
)
.
If ϕ is a ∗LM-formula and Q is a sequence of quantifiers then let Qϕ denote
the formula we get by preceding ϕ with the quantifiers Q.4
Define two PA-definable functions G∀, G∃ : M 7→ M such that the following is
provable in PA:
G∃([], y) = G∀([], y) = 0
G∀([ ∀vi ]⌢x, 0) = i
G∃([ ∃vi ]⌢x, 0) = i
G∀([ ∃vi ]⌢x, y) = G
∀(x, y)
G∃([ ∃vi ]⌢x, S(y)) = G
∃(x, y)
G∀([ ∀vi ]⌢x, S(y)) = G
∀(x, y)
G∃([ ∀vi ]⌢x, y) = G
∃(x, y).
4The exact definition of Qϕ depends on the Go¨del numbering.
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Also, define g∀Q(x) = G
∀(Q, x) and g∃Q(x) = G
∃(Q, x). Informally, if q is either
∀ or ∃ then gq
Q
(x) = i if the (x+ 1)st q-quantifier in Q bounds the variable vi.
If Qϕ is a sentence and Ψ is a Skolem operator for Q then ϕ[Ψ, a] will denote
the ∗LM-sentence we get by substituting vi, where
i = (Mx)
[
g∀Q(x) = l
]
,
by (a)l and vj , where
j = (Mx)
[
g∃Q(x) = l
]
,
by (Ψ(a))l, in ϕ. Here (Mx)ϕ(x) means ‘the greatest x such that ϕ(x),’ we are
using it instead of (µx) to take care of situations like
∀v0∃v1∀v0(v0 = v1)
where it is the second ∀ quantifier bounding v0, not the first.
If Ψ is a Skolem operator such that the function Ψ : M 7→M is LM-definable
then we say that Ψ is a definable Skolem operator.
Definition 5.13 ([Kra76]). A satisfaction class Σ is complete with respect to
definable Skolem operators if
Qϕ ∈ Σ iff there exists a definable Skolem operator Ψ for Q such that
ϕ[Ψ, a] ∈ Σ for all a ∈M.
Remark 5.14. In the standard model N of PA the only satisfaction class,
Σ0 = { ϕ ϕ ∈ ElDiag(N) } ,
is complete with respect to definable Skolem operators. This follows from the more
general fact that in any M  PA and LM-sentence Qϕ we have
M  Qϕ iff there exists a definable Skolem operator for Q such that
M  ϕ[Ψ, a] for all a ∈M.
Let us define the corresponding rule:
. . . Γ, ϕ[Ψ, a] . . . a∈M
Γ,Qϕ
(Skolem-rule)
where Ψ is a definable Skolem operator for the sequence of quantifiers Q.
Proposition 5.15. A maximally consistent set in M-logic with Skolem-rule is a
satisfaction class complete with respect to definable Skolem operators.
Proof. Left to the reader.
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5.5 Closure under predicate logic
Let Prfσ(y) denote the formula expressing that there is a (nonstandard) predicate
logic proof of y from hypothesis satisfying σ(x). The exact definition of the formula
is left to the reader to figure out. We will write Λ ⊢∗ ϕ for
M  Prfx∈Λ(ϕ).
We will add the rule
. . . Λ, ϕi . . . i<a
Γ
if
{∨
Λ ∨ ϕ0, . . . ,
∨
Λ ∨ ϕa−1
}
⊢∗
∨
Γ. (Pred)
to M-logic.
Proposition 5.16. Satisfaction classes closed under nonstandard first-order prov-
ability are precisely the maximally consistent sets in M-logic with Pred.
Proof. Left to the reader.
Let PA∗ be the set of all standard and nonstandard instances of the axioms of
PA.
Theorem 5.17 ([Kot85]). If Σ is a satisfaction class such that
〈M,Σ〉  ∀x
(
Sent(x) ∧ Prfx∈PA∗(x)→ x ∈ Σ
)
then 〈M,Σ〉 satisfies ∆0-induction, i.e.,
〈M,Σ〉  ϕ(0,Σ) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x,Σ)→ ϕ(S(x),Σ)
)
→ ∀xϕ(x,Σ)
for every LM ∪ { Σ }-formula ϕ(x,Σ) which is ∆0.
Remark 5.18. The arithmetical part of any 〈M,Σ〉 satisfying the condition in the
theorem is stronger than PA; for example, the consistency of PA is provable in such
a model, since otherwise 0 6= 0 ∈ Σ.
Remark 5.19. The previous remark shows that some countable recursively satu-
rated models of PA does not admit satisfaction classes closed under nonstandard
provability in PA. It might still be the case that any countable recursively satu-
rated model of PA admits a satisfaction class closed under nonstandard first-order
provability since it may fail to include PA∗.
6Conclusion and further work
In the first and second chapter we gave some background information, including a
short historical survey of the study of nonstandard truth. In Chapter 3 we intro-
duced a new definition of satisfaction class in a language with function symbols.
We also discussed the drawback of defining a satisfaction class as a set of pairs
of formulas and elements. The main part of the chapter led up to Theorem 3.55,
some applications were presented in the end of the chapter, such as the existence
of satisfaction classes making the sentence S(S(. . . (S(0)) . . .)) = ca true for any
nonstandard number of S symbols and any nonstandard a. Our definitions of M-
logic and template logic is rather different from other authors and we think our
notions is easier to work with.
In the chapter that followed we introduced free satisfaction class, it is a weaker
notion than satisfaction classes and in some sense it is a more natural notion, e.g.,
free M-logic is more natural than M-logic. We proved one characterisation of free
satisfaction classes in terms of free M-logic.
Chapter 5 presented some ideas of how to remove pathologies. One famous
pathology is 0 6= 0∨. . .∨0 6= 0 which can be made true for any nonstandard number
of repetitions. We highlighted some other pathologies and gave ideas of how to
remove those. We stated the question of whether there are satisfaction classes
closed under nonstandard propositional (or predicate) proofs in any countable
recursively saturated model.
We end this chapter be listing the open questions stated in the thesis.
Conjecture 3.1. There is a satisfaction class Σ, in the sense of [Kra76] and
[KKL81], such that 〈ǫa, [0]〉 ∈ Σ and 〈ǫ′a, [0]〉 /∈ Σ for some a ∈M.
Remember that ǫ0 is v0 6= v0 and ǫi+1 is ǫi∨ǫi; ǫ
′
0 is v0 6= 0 and ǫ
′
i+1 is ǫ
′
i∨ǫ
′
i. We
think that by redefining M-logic to work with pairs of LA-formulas and elements
of M it should be possible to prove the conjecture.
Question 3.7. Are satisfaction classes built up by two “parts;” one with closed
terms and equality and one with “the rest,” in the following sense: Given a relation
∼ satisfying the conditions in Proposition 3.6 is there a satisfaction class Σ such
66 Conclusion and further work
that the relation ∼Σ coincides with ∼?
A partial answer is given in Proposition 3.58. The general question seems to
be hard, since it is a question of whether a set of equalities is consistent or not in
M-logic. See also Question 5.2.
Question 4.6. Which LA-structures N ⊇ M are MΣ for some free satisfaction
class Σ?
It is a natural question to ask. It might be the case that the structures MΣ
have very specific properties, analogue to the models arising in the arithmetised
completeness theorem.
Question 4.7. Are there free satisfaction classes Σ, which are not satisfaction
classes, such that the canonical map f : M→MΣ is an elementary embedding?
If this is true, is there a corresponding extension of free M-logic?
Question 5.2. How should Figure 5.1 be completed?
The question marks are all in the column ‘Consistent?’, thus this is a question
of proving consistency of extensions of M-logic. The only tool we have to do so is
Theorem 3.55 but it will not help us in this situation. The only plausible approach
we have found is to alter the definition of template logic and template structure,
but every attempt of this has ended with tears. We think this question is very
hard.
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